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Crafting a Narrative for the Red State Option
Elizabeth Weeks Leonard1
Introduction

A

s of this writing, the Supreme Court’s decision in the Health Care Cases
is a little over a year old, and most states’ 2013 legislative sessions have
concluded. In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB),2
the Court gave states the option to expand their Medicaid programs in
accordance with the Affordable Care Act (ACA).3 Since then, states have had
a year to deliberate. It is thus an opportune time to assess the current state of
play: Just over half the states, including eight with Republican governors, have
agreed to expand Medicaid.4 Another fourteen states have rejected expansion.5
The rest, depending on whose analysis one reads, are leaning one way or are
negotiating alternative paths to expansion with the federal authorities. This
Article considers the future of NFIB’s “Red State Option”6 and offers a narrative
by which currently resistant states may come to accept Medicaid expansion.
Given that last summer more than half of the states were litigants
challenging the constitutionality of Medicaid expansion before the Supreme
Court,7 perhaps this current status is not surprising. But it is surprising when one
considers the extraordinarily good deal that the federal government is offering
states that choose to expand. For the first three years, the federal government
1 Professor, University of Georgia Law School. I am grateful to Nicole Huberfeld for inviting me to contribute to this Symposium and to the other contributing authors for the stimulating
discussion. I would also like to thank Kevin Outterson, Diane Hoffmann, and other participants at
the University of Maryland’s “State of the States” 2013 health reform roundtable for comments and
suggestions to improve this paper.
2 NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
3 Id. at 2608.
4 As of this article, twenty–six states have accepted Medicaid expansion. Where Each State
Stands on ACA’s Medicaid Expansion, Advisory Bd. Daily Briefing ( June 14, 2013), http://www.
advisory.com/Daily–Briefing/2012/11/09/MedicaidMap#lightbox/1/.
5 Carter C. Price & Christine Eibner, For States that Opt out of Medicaid Expansion: 3.6 Million
Fewer Insured and $8.4 Billion Less in Federal Payments, 32 Health Aff. 1030, 1030 (2013) (listing
Alabama, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, and Wisconsin).
6 See Nicole Huberfeld, Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, & Kevin Outterson, Plunging into Endless
Difficulties: Medicaid and Coercion in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 93
B.U. L. Rev. 1, 6 (2013).
7 See id. at 30 & n.182 (noting that twenty–six states were among the litigants in Florida ex rel.
Attorney Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), aff ’d in part,
rev’d in part sub nom. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012)).
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would pay 100% of the Medicaid expansion population’s coverage.8 After that,
the federal government would pay 95% for three more years, then pick up 90%
of the tab in perpetuity.9 Without question, states would face a much steeper
financial burden if they tried to cover the same uninsured population without
federal support. States, nevertheless, complain that even the slight, incremental
increased costs they would bear are unsustainable.10
But set the numbers aside. There are other dynamics at work. For many
reluctant states, the issue cannot be easily resolved by referencing a balance
sheet. There are fundamental principles of federalism and deeply held aversions
to the expansion of federal authority that must be heeded. For states favoring
the Red State Option, the persuasive narrative must include not only favorable
financial terms but additional key elements as well.11 The most significant of
these may be a face–saving provision, a concession from the federal government,
a bargaining chip, a tangible reminder that on some essential level states, not
the federal government, are ultimately calling the shots. As other authors have
discussed, this sort of negotiation between federal and state authorities is an
under–examined, new front of federalism.12 The Medicaid expansion dynamic
offers a particularly salient example of this process of negotiated federalism.13
Within the Medicaid expansion context, a prime case study of this federal–
state interplay is the novel arrangement approved in Arkansas.14 The deal that
8 Id. at 27.
9 Id.
10 See infra notes 173–78 (discussing estimated costs and political reactions in the state of
Georgia).
11 See infra Part IV (outlining the Red State Narrative).
12 See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Federalism by Waiver After the Health Care Case, in The
Health Care Case: The Supreme Court’s Decision and Its Implications 6–7 (Gillian
Metzger et al. eds., 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2161599
(suggesting that NFIB gives states additional bargaining power by allowing them to credibly challenge the constitutionality of underlying spending clause legislation); Charlton C. Copeland, Beyond Separation in Federalism Enforcement: Medicaid Expansion, Coercion, and the Norm of Engagement, 15 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 91, 103–04 (2012) (urging a view of federalism that considers federal–state
interactions during the policy implementation phase, not just as a matter of the legislative process);
Abbe R. Gluck, Essay, Instrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State Implementation of
Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 Yale L.J. 534, 543 (2011) (refining traditional theories
of statutory interpretation by emphasizing the role of states as implementers of federal law); Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism Under Obama, 53 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 567, 569 (2011) (“[T]he central
dynamic evident under the Obama administration to date is more active government . . . . States are
given significant room to shape their participation in the new federal initiatives, as well as enhanced
regulatory authority and expanded resources to do so.”); Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C.
L. Rev. 1, 1 (2011) (“Bridging the fields of federalism and negotiation theory, Negotiating Federalism
analyzes how public actors navigate difficult federalism terrain by negotiating directly with counterparts across state–federal lines.”).
13 Ryan, supra note 12, at 4–5 (“[T]he Medicaid program represents a site of extensive
negotiation between state and federal actors about the specifics of each state plan.”).
14 See Sam Baker, Feds Approve High–Profile ObamaCare Medicaid Waiver, The Hill (Sept. 27,
2013), http://thehill.com/blogs/healthwatch/health–reform–implementation/325123–feds–approve–
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Arkansas sought, and that the federal government approved, was to extend
Medicaid to the ACA’s expansion population using the same generous federal
funding. But the Arkansas proposal will accomplish the expansion not through
traditional Medicaid but by enrolling the additional beneficiaries in private
plans sold through the ACA’s newly established health insurance exchanges.15
This arrangement accords Arkansas the benefit of federal financial support
without compromising the Red State rhetoric that favors private market
solutions to social problems and opposes expansion of government programs,
particularly welfare programs.16
This Article examines the rhetoric and the reality behind the Red State
Option, proposing a narrative that should compel expansion in states that
opted out during this first legislative session.17 The goal herein is to chart a path
through the resistance that allows Red States to both take advantage of the
federal government’s extremely generous financial offer while saving face among
stalwart Obamacare opponents and states’ rights proponents. In addition to the
Arkansas example, case studies of negotiated federalism in Michigan, Arizona,
and Florida will be considered to illuminate the proposed Red State Narrative.
The Article proceeds in Part II with a brief description of the NFIB v.
Sebelius decision on Medicaid. Part III provides background on the Medicaid
program, highlighting the factual fallacies animating the Court’s decision.
Part IV describes the negotiated federalism landscape underlying Medicaid
expansion, including arguments for and against its expansion as well as the
case studies mentioned above. Part V concludes by outlining the Red State
Narrative.
I. NFIB V. SEBELIUS: Creating the Red State Option
The Supreme Court’s NFIB v. Sebelius opinion was surprising in several
regards.18 Many ACA opponents were surprised that the Court upheld the
constitutionality of the individual mandate and even more surprised that the
Roberts opinion relied on the taxing power to support its conclusion.19 At
high–profile–waiver–for–obamacare–medicaid–expansion; Steven Ross Johnson, Reform Update:
CMS’ Approval of Ark. Medicaid Expansion Plan Bodes Well for Other States, Modern Healthcare
(Oct. 1, 2013), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20131001/NEWS/310019963.
15 Sara Rosenbaum & Benjamin D. Sommers, Using Medicaid to Buy Private Health Insurance
– The Great New Experiment?, 369 New Eng. J. Med. 7, 7 (2013) [hereinafter Rosenbaum & Sommers, The Great New Experiment]; see infra Part III.C.2 (discussing the Arkansas plan).
16 See Baker, supra note 14 (“Arkansas Gov. Mike Beebe, a Democrat leading a deeply conservative state, crafted the option as a way to expand healthcare coverage without fully signing on to
an expanded government program.”).
17 See infra Part IV (outlining five key elements of the Red State Narrative).
18 See Huberfeld et al., supra note 6, at 36; see also Charles Fried, The June Surprises: Balls,
Strikes, and the Fog of War, 38 J. Health Pol. Pol’y & L. 225 (2012).
19 NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2601 (2012); see, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The Disdain Campaign, 126 Harv. L. Rev. F. 1, 10 (2012) (“To ‘save’ the rest of Obamacare, the Chief Justice essen-
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the same time, ACA supporters were unsettled by the Court’s extended, and
arguably unnecessary, discussion of the Commerce Clause, which concluded
that the individual mandate exceeded Congress’s power to regulate interstate
commerce.20 But most surprising of all was the Court’s holding that mandatory
expansion of Medicaid violated the spending power and could stand only
if expansion were made optional, with no threat to states’ existing federal
Medicaid dollars if they opted out.21
The NFIB Medicaid decision was unprecedented as a matter of federalism
jurisprudence. No Supreme Court decision since 1937 had struck down a
federal spending power program.22 No prior decision had actually held that
a federal program was unconstitutionally coercive, despite suggestions in two
earlier cases that such a limit on federal power might exist.23 No lower court
rulings in the Health Care Cases had held the ACA’s Medicaid expansion
unconstitutional. Accordingly, lower courts’ opinions, as well as litigants’ and
amici’s briefs, had given little consideration to the question of remedy should
the Medicaid challenge succeed. By contrast, there was ample discussion of the
effect of a ruling that the individual mandate was unconstitutional.24
tially deleted the ‘requirement’ part. So the mandate qua mandate is gone. What is left is a tax.”);
David Bernstein, Is This 1936?, SCOTUSBlog ( June 29, 2012, 9:32 AM), http://www.scotusblog.
com/2012/06/is–this–1936/ (“Like the other Justice [Owen] Roberts in . . . 1936, the current Justice
Roberts unexpectedly voted with a 5–4 majority to continue the old regime.”); Ilya Somin, A Taxing, but Potentially Hopeful Decision, SCOTUSBlog ( June 28, 2012, 6:13 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/a–taxing–but–potentially–hopeful–decision/ (“The ruling also runs counter to
repeated statements by President Obama and numerous congressional Democrats, who assured us
that the mandate was not a tax.”).
20 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2585–91; see, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Foreword: Democracy and Disdain,
126 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 47 (2012) (calling Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion “probably the most grudging
opinion ever to uphold a major piece of legislation”); Gregory P. Magarian, Chief Justice Roberts’s
Individual Mandate: The Lawless Medicine of NFIB v. Sebelius, 108 Nw. U. L. Rev. Colloquy 15, 19
(2013) (“The Chief Justice’s analysis of the commerce power and the Necessary and Proper Clause
announces no legal holding of the Court. No other Justice joined or concurred in this portion of
his opinion; it represents the Chief Justice’s solitary view. Why did the four joint dissenters, who
echo the Chief Justice’s restrictive federal power analysis, decline even to concur in his judgment?
Presumably because this part of the Chief Justice’s opinion announces no judgment in which to
concur.”); David A. Strauss, Commerce Clause Revisionism and the Affordable Care Act, 2012 Sup. Ct.
Rev. 1, 26 (“NFIB was a remarkable decision, and not in a good way. Five Justices were willing to
conclude that an important Act of Congress exceeded Congress’s power under the Commerce
Clause, and to reach that conclusion on the basis of reasoning that, if I am right, was very weak.”).
21 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2608.
22 See id. at 2630 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (alteration in original) (“The Chief Justice therefore—for the first time ever—finds
an exercise of Congress’ spending power unconstitutionally coercive.”).
23 See Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 585–93 (1937) (upholding unemployment compensation provisions of Social Security Act of 1935); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 212 (1987)
(upholding state drinking age condition on federal highway funding).
24 See, e.g., Florida ex rel. Bondi v. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1307
(N.D. Fla. 2011) (Vinson, J.) (holding that the individual mandate was unconstitutional and the
provision was not severable, thereby striking down the entire law), aff ’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom.
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With little guidance from litigants or judges, the Court was left to craft
its own remedy for its declaration that Medicaid expansion could not stand
as written in the ACA. The Court’s Medicaid decision, for all its surprises,
was relatively restrained. To be clear, no provision of the ACA itself was
struck down or ruled unconstitutional. Rather, the Court simply held that
an existing, long–standing penalty available to the Secretary of Health and
Human Services (HHS) could not apply to states that chose not to extend
Medicaid benefits to the ACA expansion population.25 Since its enactment, the
Medicaid statute gave the Secretary authority to withhold all federal dollars
from a state that failed to comply with statutory requirements of the program.26
The Secretary, however, has never actually invoked that penalty, preferring to
negotiate remedial measures with noncompliant states and maintain coverage
for beneficiaries to the extent possible.27
Because the ACA seemed to require states to expand their Medicaid
programs as a mandatory condition to continued program participation, the
total withholding of funds penalty would seem to be available.28 That possibility,
Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011)
(finding the individual mandate constitutional but severable, such that the rest of the law remained
intact), aff ’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012); Mead v. Holder,
766 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 2011) (holding that the individual mandate did not violate the Commerce Clause or the Religious Freedom Restoration Act), aff ’d sub nom. Seven–Sky v. Holder, 661
F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 63 (2012) and abrogated by NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct.
2566 (2012); Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010) (holding that
the individual mandate was unconstitutional in light of Virginia’s recently enacted law purporting
to nullify the mandate), vacated, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011) (dismissing since State lacked standing
to challenge the individual mandate), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 59 (2012). See also Liberty Univ., Inc.
v. Geithner, 753 F. Supp. 2d 611 (W.D. Va. 2010) (upholding individual mandate as constitutional),
vacated, 671 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2011), abrogated by NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 183 L. Ed. 2d 450
(2012); Thomas More Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (finding the individual
mandate constitutional under the Commerce Clause), aff ’d, 651 F.3d 529 (6th Cir. 2011), abrogated by
NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
25 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2607 (plurality opinion) (“What Congress is not free to do is penalize
States that choose not to participate in that new program by taking away their existing Medicaid
funding.”).
26 Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. 89–97, § 121(a), 79 Stat. 286, 351 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396c (2012)).
27 Huberfeld et al., supra note 6, at 17 (“Not once in the nearly fifty–year history of the [Medicaid] program has the federal government withdrawn all federal funding from a noncompliant
state.”); see Bagenstos, supra note 12, at 5 (citing Edward A. Tomlinson & Jerry L. Mashaw, The
Enforcement of Federal Standards in Grant–in–Aid Programs: Suggestions for Beneficiary Involvement,
58 Va. L. Rev. 600, 620 (1972)) (“[F]ederal agencies virtually never cut off all funds to states that fail
to comply with the terms of a given program, even though the relevant statute will often authorize
such a sanction. Federal officials simply do not want to harm a program’s beneficiaries by cutting
off funds to a noncompliant state.”).
28 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396c (2012) (giving the Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary the
ability, after appropriate notice and hearing procedures, to cease making payments to a state “until
the Secretary is satisfied that there will no longer be any such failure to comply [with § 1396a(a)’s
requirements]”).
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the Court said, could not stand.29 Threatening a state’s entire federal Medicaid
matching dollars—money on which states have relied on for decades to provide
health care to particularly needy individuals and money that represents a
substantial portion of states’ budgets—on compliance with the ACA’s expansion
provisions passed the point at which “pressure turns into compulsion.”30 It was
“coercive,” as suggested by two prior Supreme Court opinions, although those
earlier decisions concluded that the challenged statutes at issue did not cross
the unconstitutional line.31
To remedy the unconstitutionality, the Court adopted a narrow remedy,
suggested by Justice Ginsburg and approved by Solicitor General Paul
Clement, late in the extra innings of oral arguments.32 The Court ruled that the
ACA’s expansion of Medicaid must be read not as mandatory, but as optional.33
States must be free to opt out, with no threat to their existing federal Medicaid
dollars, or opt in, thereby receiving the generous initial 100% federal funding
and perpetual 90% federal funding for the new population of beneficiaries.
Opt–in states would be subject to all Medicaid requirements, new and old,
including the “lose–all” penalty for noncompliance with both pre–ACA and
ACA–amended Medicaid requirements.34
Essential to the Court’s ruling was the conclusion that the ACA
fundamentally changed the nature of the existing Medicaid program, rendering
it different in kind, not just degree.35 What Congress could not do, without
running awry of the coercion doctrine, was to condition states’ funding under an
existing federal program on compliance with a new, different federal program.36
To reach the conclusion that the ACA operated as a “new” program, rather
than simply an amendment to an existing program, Chief Justice Roberts noted
three key differences between “old” and “new” Medicaid: a different population
of eligible beneficiaries, a different package of benefits, and a different federal
29 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2607 (plurality opinion) (“What Congress is not free to do is to penalize
States that choose not to participate in that new program by taking away their existing Medicaid
funding. Section 1396c gives the Secretary of Health and Human Services the authority to do just
that.”).
30 Id. at 2634 (quoting Steward Mach., 301 U.S. 548 590 (1937)).
31 Huberfeld et al., supra note 6, at 3 (discussing Steward Mach., 301 U.S. at 585–93, and South
Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 212 (1987)).
32 See id. at 72 & n.469 (quoting oral argument transcript).
33 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2607.
34 Id. (“Today’s holding does not affect the continued application of § 1396c to the existing
Medicaid program. Nor does it affect the Secretary’s ability to withdraw funds provided under the
Affordable Care Act if a State that has chosen to participate in the expansion fails to comply with
the requirements of that Act.”).
35 Id. at 2605 (“The Medicaid expansion, however, accomplishes a shift in kind, not merely
degree.”).
36 See id. at 2605. See generally Huberfeld et al., supra note 6, at 21 (“The NFIB plurality fundamentally misunderstood th[e Medicaid program’s] history, leading it to overemphasize discontinuities between the existing Medicaid program and the Medicaid expansion. The plurality artificially
split Medicaid into two programs: old and new.”).
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funding scheme.37 As the next Part explains, however, none of those aspects
of the ACA amendments are fundamentally different from the historical
operation of the Medicaid program over the past five decades. The Court, and
subsequently ACA opponents, overplayed the apparent differences to support
the Red State Option.
II. Medicaid Then and Now
To appreciate the underlying congressional design of ACA’s Medicaid
expansion and the unintended consequences of the Supreme Court’s creation
of the Red State Option in NFIB v. Sebelius, a brief background on the program
is helpful. Where Congress, in the ACA, knitted together a near–complete
safety net of insurance coverage for previously uninsured Americans, the Court,
in NFIB, left a gaping hole through which a substantial number of low–income
adults will be left without any assistance to obtain health insurance, at least in
states that elect the Red State Option. By placing the ACA amendments in
the context of the Medicaid program’s history and evolution, this Part provides
perspective on the terms of the arrangement that states are invited to accept.
The first essential element of the Red State Narrative is the recognition that the
ACA’s Medicaid expansion is not so different in kind as the Court suggested.
A. Medicaid Expansion Under the ACA
The ACA, as a result of public preferences and political reality, did not
radically overhaul the United States health care system. Single–payer health
care was never even on the table, and the so–called “public option” received
only nominal consideration.38 Instead, the ACA builds on the United States’
admittedly anachronistic, hybrid public–private health care system. The current
system operates from the assumption that at least some individuals should not
be left to fend for themselves in the private market for health care, but instead,
should receive public assistance.
The ACA aims to expand private insurance coverage in both the dominant
employer–based market and the underutilized individual health insurance
market through a range of strategies. For large employers, the ACA implements
default enrollment requirements, meaning that employees are automatically

37 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605–06.
38 See generally M. Gregg Bloche, The Emergent Logic of Health Law, 82 S. Cal. L. Rev. 389,
443 (2009) (discussing the possibility of single–payer or public option approaches); James Brasfield,
The Politics of Ideas: Where Did the Public Option Come from and Where Is it Going?, 36 J. Health
Pol. Pol’y & L. 455 (2011); Brendan S. Maher, The Benefits of Opt–In Federalism, 52 B.C. L. Rev. 1733,
1740–50 (2011) (“In America, the current political environment suggests no epic expansion of the
[health care] benefit as entitlement approach is in the foreseeable future.”); N. Gregory Mankiw,
The Pitfalls of the Public Option, N.Y. Times, June 28, 2009, at BU5; Op–Ed., The End of Private
Health Insurance, Wall St. J., Apr. 13, 2009, at A14.
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enrolled in an employer–based plan and must actively opt out.39 Large employers
are also subject to limited penalties for failing to provide affordable health plans
to employees.40 With respect to small employers, the ACA offers generous tax
credits to encourage them to offer health insurance to employees41 and creates
a new Small–Business Health Options Program (SHOP).42
The ACA’s strategies to expand coverage in the private, individual health
insurance market include the health insurance exchanges, the individual
mandate, and insurance underwriting reforms. Without the advantage of large
risk pools characteristic of employer group plans, individual health plans have
long been more difficult and expensive to obtain.43 The ACA aims to remedy
noted dysfunctions in the individual market by prohibiting pre–existing
condition exclusions44 and discriminatory health status pricing.45 The individual
mandate, or minimum essential coverage provision,46 and exchanges47 support
these reforms by expanding risk pools and equalizing insurer pricing.
The ACA also expands public assistance, specifically, Medicaid. Under the
terms of the statute, all Americans earning below 133% of the federal poverty
level (FPL) are eligible for Medicaid.48 This approach to Medicaid expansion
won out over other proposals, including: the House Leadership bill, which
would have raised Medicaid eligibility to 150% FPL,49 a public option,50 and
full reliance on tax subsidies for uninsured individuals to purchase private health

39 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), Pub. L. No. 111–148, § 1151, 124 Stat. 119,
252 (2010) (codified as 29 U.S.C. § 218A (2012) (mandating that automatic enrollment is applicable
to employers with more than 200 full–time employees).
40 PPACA § 1401 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 36B (2012)); PPACA § 1513 (codified as
amended at I.R.C. § 2980H (2012)). Effective in 2015 the amendment is applicable to employers
with 51 or more full–time equivalent employees.
41 I.R.C. § 45R(g) (2012). A small employer is defined as an employer with “no more than 25
full–time equivalent employees for the taxable year.” I.R.C. § 45R(d)(1).
42 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b)(1)(B) (2012).
43 See Amy B. Monahan, Health Insurance Risk Pooling and Social Solidarity: A Response to
Professor David Hyman, 14 Conn. Ins. L.J. 325, 327–28 (2008); Allison K. Hoffman, Oil and Water:
Mixing Individual Mandates, Fragmented Markets, and Health Reform, 36 Am. J.L. & Med. 7, 51–53
(2010).
44 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–3 (2012).
45 42 U.S.C. § 300gg(a).
46 I.R.C. § 5000A (2012).
47 42 U.S.C. § 18031 (2012).
48 Under the ACA, a family of four with an annual income of roughly $31,000 would be below
133% FPL and thus eligible for Medicaid. PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111–148, § 2001(a)(1), 124 Stat. 119, 271
(2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (2012)).
49 John Holahan, Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid & the Uninsured, The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Alternatives for Financing Medicaid Expansions in Health Reform
1 (Dec, 2009), available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8029.pdf.
50 Robert Pear & Jackie Calmes, Senators Reject Pair of Public Option Proposals, N.Y. Times
(Sept. 29, 2009), at A18, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/30/health/policy/30health.html.
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insurance.51 The policy compromise struck in the ACA is that impoverished
Americans will be provided government health insurance through Medicaid
while low–income individuals will be required to purchase health insurance
in the private market, with some federal financial assistance through premium
assistance tax credits.52
At the time of the ACA’s enactment, Medicaid covered sixty million
Americans.53 By 2020, 25% of the U.S. population was expected to be covered
by Medicaid.54 Following the NFIB decision, the Congressional Budget Office
adjusted prior projections, estimating that six million fewer people would be
newly enrolled in Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Program
(CHIP) as a result of states opting out.55 For many of these now excluded
individuals and families, there is no other affordable coverage.
B. Medicaid Primer
Medicaid is a long–standing strategy for providing health insurance
coverage to the “deserving” poor.56 Traditionally, the deserving poor have
included women, particularly widows, and their children, the blind, the disabled,
and the impoverished elderly.57 The prevailing belief was that the working poor
51 See Sara Rosenbaum & Benjamin D. Sommers, Rethinking Medicaid in the New Normal,
5 St. Louis U. J. Health L. & Pol’y 127, 130 n.18 (2011) (suggesting that the proposal to cover all
low–income adults through the exchanges was rejected because the federal government would have
assumed the full cost, as compared to Medicaid, under which states and the federal government
share the cost); Leighton Ku & Matthew Broaddus, Public And Private Health Insurance: Stacking
up the Costs, 27 Health Aff. w318, w326 (2008), http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/27/4/w318.
full.pdf; Leighton Ku, Expanding Coverage for Low–Income Americans: Medicaid or Health Insurance
Exchanges?, Health Aff. Blog ( June 23, 2009), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2009/06/23/expanding–coverage–for–low–income–americans–medicaid–of–health–insurance–exchanges/.
52 See I.R.C. § 36B (20122011) (providing for premium assistance tax credits for purchase of
qualified health plans).
53 Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Rhetorical Federalism: The Value of State–Based Dissent to Federal
Health Reform, 39 Hofstra L. Rev. 111, 136 (2010) [hereinafter Leonard, Rhetorical Federalism]; see
also Sara Rosenbaum, A “Customary and Necessary” Program – Medicaid and Health Reform, 362 New
Eng. J. Med. 1952, 1952 (2010).
54 Leonard, Rhetorical Federalism, supra note 53, at 136.
55 Cong.Budget Office, Estimates for the Insurance Coverage Provisions of the
Affordable Care Act Updated for the Recent Supreme Court Decision 8 ( July 2012),
available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43472–07–24–2012–CoverageEstimates.pdf [hereinafter CBO, July 2012].
56 See Sara Rosenbaum et al., Public Health Insurance Design for Children: The Evolution from
Medicaid to SCHIP, 1 J. Health & Biomed. L. 1, 7–8 (2004) (“Medicaid is the largest surviving
public means–tested legal entitlement.”).
57 Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Disentitlement? The Threats Facing Our Public
Health–Care Programs and a Rights–Based Response 80 (2003) (listing the beneficiaries of
state and federal public assistance programs); Robert Stevens & Rosemary Stevens, Welfare
Medicine in America: A Case Study of Medicaid 6–7 (1974) (identifying targets of special assistance programs during the early twentieth century); Nicole Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, 14
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deserved assistance, while the non–working poor, or paupers, did not.58 Before
the New Deal, federal funding for health care was largely limited to public
health objectives, including infectious disease control, which focused on the
immigrant population, as well as limited assistance to pregnant women, infants,
and disabled children.59
1. Origins of Medicaid.—The Social Security Act of 1935 (SSA) provides the
statutory basis for both Medicare and Medicaid, although those two signature
health insurance programs would not be enacted for another thirty years.60
As part of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal legislation, the SSA
effectively codified the historical categories of deserving poor—the elderly,
children, widows and widowers, blind, disabled, and unemployed—deeming
them eligible for government assistance through income security.61 With the
exception of limited, open–ended federal grants to states,62 the framers of the
1935 SSA put the goal of government health insurance aside due to political
objections, including widespread fear of socialized medicine and tenuous
political support for the SSA itself.63 Health care would not be added to the
SSA until President Lyndon B. Johnson’s 1965 War on Poverty.64
In 1965, Congress enacted comprehensive, federal health insurance
benefits for the elderly. The new Medicare program included Part A, covering
inpatient hospital care, and Part B, covering outpatient and physician services.65
Medicaid was something of an afterthought in the 1965 amendments.66 Unlike
Medicare, which operates as a type of public pension, available to all elderly
Americans regardless of income, Congress intended Medicaid as a means–
tested welfare program.67 Medicaid would provide health care to the needy,

U. Pa. J. Const. L. 431, 439 (2011) [hereinafter Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid].
58 See Stevens & Stevens, supra note 57, at 11 (describing the clear division between contributing work–related social insurance to workers and giving to the “poor”).
59 See Lawrence O. Gostin, Public Health Law: Power, Duty, Restraint 155–56, 159–
60 (2d ed. 2008); Paul Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine 240–42
(1982); Elizabeth Fee & Theodore M. Brown, The Unfulfilled Promise of Public Health: Déjà Vu All
Over Again, 21 Health Aff., no. 6, 2002, at 31, 34–35.
60 Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, supra note 57, at 441; Elizabeth A. Weeks, Cooperative Federalism and Healthcare Reform: The Medicare Part D “Clawback” Example, 1 St. Louis U. J.
Health L. & Pol’y 79, 83–84 (2007) [hereinafter Weeks, Cooperative Federalism].
61 Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, supra note 57, at 441.
62 See Starr, supra note 59, at 270; Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, supra note 57, at 442 &
n.47.
63 See Starr, supra note 59, at 266–69; Robert I. Field, Regulation, Reform and the Creation of
Free Market Health Care, 32 Hamline J. Pub. L. & Pol’y 301, 308 (2011).
64 See Starr, supra note 59, at 369.
65 Weeks, Cooperative Federalism, supra note 60, at 83.
66 See Stevens & Stevens, supra note 57, at 51 (describing Medicaid as “ill–designed” compared to Medicare).
67 See Starr, supra note 59, at 368–70.
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including individuals impoverished by staggeringly high medical expenses.68
Unlike prior federal conditional spending programs, which operated as limited
grants–in–aid to states, Medicaid was created and continues to offer open–
ended federal funding to the states so long as they comply with broad federal
requirements under the Medicaid Act.69 Medicaid was well received by the
states, as evidenced by the vast majority electing to participate in the program
within a few years of its enactment.70
2. Medicaid Coverage.—At its enactment, Medicaid targeted the now–familiar
categories of deserving poor who were elsewise eligible for assistance under
existing government programs.71 The original groups entitled to Medicaid on
a mandatory basis were elderly and disabled persons receiving welfare under
federal cash assistance programs, and dependent children and their caretaker
relatives receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).72
Congress later replaced the cash assistance programs for the disabled adults,
dependent children, and impoverished elderly with Supplemental Security
Income (SSI). These groups continued to qualify for Medicaid on the basis of
SSI eligibility.73 Additionally, Congress later replaced AFDC with Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) but retained the historical AFDC
eligibility category for Medicaid.74
The Medicaid Act established varying eligibility poverty thresholds for
the above–listed welfare categories. But once applicants meet the income and
categorical eligibility requirements, they are eligible for a defined medical
assistance package75 characterized by uniform, statewide benefits,76 and
open selection of healthcare providers.77 By design, Medicaid “mainstreams”
68 See Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 36–37 (1981) (describing enactment of Medicaid
program); Brogan v. Miller, 537 F. Supp. 139, 142 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Rosenbaum et al., supra note 56, 7–8
(characterizing Medicaid as “an ‘afterthought’ to Medicare, and a ‘relegation’ to states of responsibility for insuring the poor”).
69 Efforts to metamorphose Medicaid into a capped block grant have failed. See, e.g., Jeanne
M. Lambrew, Making Medicaid a Block Grant Program: An Analysis of the Implications of Past Proposals, 83 Milbank Q. 41, 46–47 (2005) (outlining the efforts of Newt Gingrich and George Bush to
make a capped block grant part of federal Medicaid funding).
70 See Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, supra note 57, at 445 & n.69 (noting that the holdouts,
Arizona and Alaska, joined Medicaid in 1982 and 1972, respectively).
71 Id. at 445–46.
72 Sara Rosenbaum et. al., Law and the American Health Care System 503 (2d ed.
2012).
73 Id. at 503.
74 Id. at 503 & n.*.
75 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8), (10)(B) (2012) (mandating that medical assistance for Medicaid
enrollees be equal in amount, scope, and duration to the assistance given to any other individual).
76 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(1) (providing that a state medical assistance plan must “be in effect in
all political subdivisions of the State”).
77 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23) (2006) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23) (2012)) (allowing
Medicaid enrollees to choose their own practitioners and medical facilities).
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beneficiaries, ensuring access to the same hospitals, physicians, and other health
care providers as privately insured patients, rather than relegating them to public
wards or clinics.78 Medicaid has no pre–existing condition exclusions and no
waiting periods.79 While health care providers are not required to participate in
the Medicaid program, states are required to provide reimbursement adequate
to ensure sufficient provider participation.80 States that elect to participate
in Medicaid have considerable discretion over eligibility requirements and
program benefits.81 The federal Medicaid statute requires states to cover certain
beneficiaries and services, but states can expand eligibility and services beyond
those mandatory groups and services.82 As long as states comply with the
broad federal requirements, they receive open–ended federal matching dollars
to support their state Medicaid programs.83 If the Secretary of HHS, after
providing reasonable notice and opportunity for hearing to the state Medicaid
agency, determines that a state plan has fallen out of compliance or substantially
fails to comply with federal Medicaid requirements, the Secretary has limited
discretion to withhold federal funding related to the noncompliance until the
plan is corrected.84
C. Different in Degree, But Not in Kind
Over the life of the Medicaid program, Congress has repeatedly amended
and expanded the program in various respects.85 As Sara Rosenbaum noted, “[t]
hese expansions read like a litany of social problems.”86 Expansion of Medicaid
to address national problems has been a hallmark of the program since its

78 Sara Rosenbaum, Medicaid at Forty: Revisiting Structure and Meaning in a Post–Deficit Reduction Act Era, 9 J. Health Care L. & Pol’y 5, 9 (2006) [hereinafter Rosenbaum, Medicaid at
Forty].
79 Rosenbaum, Medicaid at Forty, supra note 78, at 12; see 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(34).
80 § 1396a(a)(30)(A).
81 See Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 37 (1981) (describing “categorically” and “medically” needy beneficiaries); Copeland, supra note 12, at 134 (“Medicaid’s structure allows states considerable discretion in the design of state programs.”); Eleanor D. Kinney, Rule and Policy Making
for the Medicaid Program: A Challenge to Federalism, 51 Ohio St. L.J. 855, 857 (1990) (“[B]ecause
states have great flexibility . . . the Medicaid program is really 50 very different programs serving
different populations and providing different benefits.”); Rosenbaum, Medicaid at Forty, supra note
78, at 12–13 (describing Medicaid eligibility and coverage); Weeks, Cooperative Federalism, supra
note 60, at 83–84.
82 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)–(ii) (2012). Additional services also can receive matching
funds. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a) (2012) (defining services that qualify as “medical assistance” and
therefore receive funding).
83 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396b (2012) (addressing how the federal government makes payments to
states).
84 42 U.S.C. § 1396c (2012).
85 Rosenbaum, Medicaid at Forty, supra note 78, at 18–19.
86 Id. at 16.
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inception.87 In light of this history, the Supreme Court’s conclusion—that the
ACA amendments fundamentally altered the nature of the Medicaid program,
creating a “new” program and conditioning state funding to an unprecedented
and unconstitutional extent—is clearly wrong. The eligibility, coverage, and
funding provisions are consistent with the program’s history and well within
the scope of Congress’s statutory authority. These points bear emphasis in
crafting the Red State Narrative, clarifying that what the ACA asks of states
is not as dramatically different or as threatening to states’ rights as opponents
would suggest.
1. Prior Eligibility Challenges.—In 1965, when Medicaid was enacted, there was
no question that children were among the deserving poor. Consistent with that
policy, Medicaid was soon expanded to address nationwide concerns regarding
children’s health, including rampant poor health among preschool children and
high failure rates by young draftees on Army physical exams.88 In response,
Congress enacted a suite of reforms in 1967 including, strengthening the
education and training of pediatric health professionals. The 1967 amendments
also provided direct financing to state and local public health departments to
identify, screen, and treat impoverished children and youth.89
Reflecting a change in traditional eligibility categories under federal law,
Congress expanded Medicaid coverage just a few years later. In 1972, Congress
ended the federal–state cooperative welfare program for the aged, blind, and
disabled replacing it with federal Supplemental Security Income (SSI).90
Congress revised Medicaid to reflect this new national policy and required
states to either extend Medicaid to all individuals eligible for the new SSI
program or, under the so–called 209(b) option, allow those individuals with
incomes above the prior program’s eligibility limits to qualify for Medicaid by
deducting medical expenses from income.91 Although the 1972 amendments
allowed States two options in order to comply with the new national policy,
states did not have the option to forgo Medicaid expansion entirely.92

87 See Sidney D. Watson, The View from the Bottom: Consumer–Directed Medicaid and Cost–
Shifting to Patients, 51 St. Louis U. L.J. 403, 405 (2007); see Sara Rosenbaum, Medicaid, 346 New
Eng. J. Med. 635, 635 (2002).
88 Sara Rosenbaum et al., National Security and U.S. Child Health Policy: The Origins and Continuing Role of Medicaid and EPSDT 6–11 (2005), available at http://sphhs.gwu.edu/departments/
healthpolicy/CHPR/downloads/mil_prep042605.pdf.
89 Social Security Act Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90–248, § 301, 81 Stat. 821, 921–28
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 701–731 (2012)).
90 Social Security Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92–603, §§ 201, 301, 86 Stat. 1329,
1370, 1465 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
91 § 209, 86 Stat. 1329, 1381–82; § 301, 86 Stat. 1329, 1465 .
92 Act of July 9, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93–66, § 212, 87 Stat. 152, 155–58 (defining mandatory SSI
coverage).
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In 1988, Congress went even further and completely delinked Medicaid
eligibility for children and pregnant women from federal–state cooperative
welfare programs. Instead, Congress created across–the–board, mandatory
eligibility categories up to 133% FPL for children from birth to age five and
for pregnant women, and up to 100% FPL for children ages six to eighteen.93
Again, Congress did not offer states any choice about extending coverage, other
than leaving Medicaid entirely.94
Like these prior changes, the ACA expands Medicaid by adding a new
category of beneficiaries and lowering the income threshold for certain currently
eligible groups. The ACA extends Medicaid eligibility to all children and adults
under sixty–five with incomes up to 133% FPL who are not pregnant, eligible
for Medicare, or otherwise eligible through another mandatory Medicaid
category.95 Under the ACA, income eligibility for Medicaid will be determined
based on a modified adjusted gross income standard, which disregards the first
5% of the applicant’s income, effectively raising the income level to 138%.96
The ACA’s Medicaid expansion is particularly significant for non–elderly, non–
disabled, low–income single adults or couples without children because they
previously would not have qualified for Medicaid, or would have qualified only
to a limited extent in those few states that opted to cover them.
Chief Justice Roberts maintained that this coverage expansion under the
ACA fundamentally transformed Medicaid, making it “no longer a program
to care for the neediest among us, but rather an element of a comprehensive
national plan to provide universal health insurance coverage.”97 But that
distinction is more a matter of semantics than substance. As Justice Ginsburg
93 See Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act (MCCA) of 1988, Pub. L. 100–360, § 302, 102
Stat. 683, 750–54 (adding 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(A)(10)(i), 1396a(l) (2012)); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101–508, § 4601, 104 Stat. 1388, 166–67 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1396a (2012)).
94 See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101–239, §6401, 103 Stat.
2106, 2258–59 (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i), 1396a(l) (2012)) (mandating eligibility for
pregnant women and children under six up to 133% FPL); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101–508, § 4601, 104 Stat. 1388, 166–67 (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(10)(A)
(i), 1396a(),(l) (2012)) (setting eligibility for children between six and eighteen years of age at 100%
FPL).
95 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII) (2012).
96 See PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111–148, § 1401, 124 Stat. 119, 217–18 (2010) (codified as amended
at I.R.C. § 36 (2012)) (defining “modified adjusted gross income,” or MAGI); Medicaid Program;
Eligibility Changes Under the Affordable Care Act of 2010, 77 Fed. Reg. 17,144, 17,146 (Mar. 23,
2012) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 435.119); see also Sara Rosenbaum, A “Customary and Necessary”
Program – Medicaid and Health Care Reform, 36 New Eng. J. Med. 1952, 1953 (2010) (citing Congressional Budget Office estimates that new income calculation methods will effectively raise the
threshold to 138% of the FPL); The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Determining Income for
Adults Applying for Medicaid and Exchange Coverage Subsidies: How Income Measured With a Prior Tax Return Compares to Current Income at Enrollment 1 (Mar.
2011), http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8168.pdf.
97 NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2606 (2012) (plurality opinion).
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queried, surely a single adult earning under 138% FPL, or roughly $15,000
annually, is among the neediest among us.98
In sum, the established history of significant changes to and expansions
of Medicaid eligibility demonstrate that the ACA’s expansion to low–income,
working–age adults was neither unprecedented nor different in kind. Congress
has repeatedly added new beneficiaries to the Medicaid rolls, without giving
states the option to decline coverage to the new population. Moreover, the
Medicaid statute expressly authorizes Congress to amend the statute,99 and the
ACA’s amendments did not cross any constitutionally significant line.
2. Prior Benefits Changes.—Chief Justice Roberts further suggested that the
ACA’s Medicaid amendments were different in kind because the expansion
population would receive a different set of benefits from the current Medicaid
population.100 But this sort of change, too, is not unprecedented. Although a
uniform package of benefits was one of Medicaid’s hallmarks, Congress has
amended these benefits over time to include variations for certain beneficiaries.
The ACA does not represent a new federal–state program but merely follows a
longstanding trend.
First, as part of the 1967 amendments expanding coverage for children
under Medicaid, Congress dramatically expanded the Medicaid coverage
requirements, creating the Early and Periodic Screening Diagnosis and
Treatment (EPSDT) Program.101 EPSDT is a mandatory set of services and
benefits for all individuals under the age of twenty–one who are enrolled in
Medicaid.102 EPSDT requires states to cover, at a minimum, comprehensive
health and developmental history, physical exams, immunizations, laboratory
tests, and health education as well as vision, dental, and hearing services.103
States are also required to cover care needed to diagnose or treat any condition
detected by the EPSDT screening, even if that treatment is not otherwise
available under a state’s Medicaid plan.104 EPSDT expanded the mandatory
98 Id. at 2636 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (“Single adults earning no more than $14,856 per year—133% of the current federal
poverty level—surely rank among the Nation’s poor.”).
99 42 U.S.C. § 1304 (2012) (“The right to alter, amend, or repeal any provision of [the Medicaid
Act] is hereby reserved to the Congress.”).
100 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605–06 (plurality opinion).
101 Social Security Act Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90–248, §§ 301–02, 81 Stat. 821,
921–29 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 701–31, 1396d (2012)) (implementing a major expansion
of Medicaid coverage concerning the healthcare needs of children under twenty–one, including
early screening and prevention measures to ensure continued health).
102 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(43), 1396d(r) (2012); see Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 433–34 (2004)
(describing the EPSDT program).
103 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r).
104 See § 1396d(r)(5) (defining EPSDT to include “[s]uch other necessary health care, diagnostic services, treatment, and other measures described in subsection (a) of this section to correct
or ameliorate defects and physical and mental illnesses and conditions discovered by the screening
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coverage standards for children to a level unequaled in public or private health
insurance at the time.105 Since 1967, Congress has strengthened EPSDT several
times, often over political objections from some states.106 Yet these provisions
stand as constitutional exercise of federal power.
One of Congress’s most significant modifications of Medicaid was to grant
the Secretary of HHS the authority to issue waivers allowing states to vary
from the requirements of the federal Medicaid Act.107 Beginning in 1981,
Congress authorized Section 1915(b) waivers to provide home and community–
based services allowing individuals to avoid institutionalization.108 Later
Congress added Section 1115 waivers, which allow broad flexibility and state
experimentation to cover the uninsured so long as states do not increase costs
to the federal government.109 Over the years, states have received Section 1115
waivers of varying scope and purpose while implementing unique Medicaid
strategies.110 The ACA affirms the availability of Section 1115 waivers, but
services, whether or not such services are covered under the State plan.”).
105 See Sara Rosenbaum & Paul H. Wise, Crossing the Medicaid–Private Insurance Divide: The
Case of EPSDT, 26 Health Aff. 382, 383–84 (2007).
106 See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101–239, § 6403, 103 Stat.
2106, 2262–63 (further delineating the scope of EPSDT benefit, including an express mandate that
states cover “[s]uch other necessary health care, diagnostic services, treatment, and other measures
. . . to correct or ameliorate defects and physical and mental illnesses and conditions discovered
by the screening services, whether or not such services are covered under the State plan”); Deficit
Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–171, § 6044(a), 120 Stat. 4, 88–89 (requires states to preserve
EPSDT coverage in benchmark packages); Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) Reauthorization Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111–3, § 611, 123 Stat. 8, 100 (clarifying requirement to provide
EPSDT in benchmark packages); PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111–148, § 2201, 124 Stat. 119, 289–91 (2010)
(preserving EPSDT as part of the newly reconfigured benchmarks); see also Alice Sardell & Kay
Johnson, The Politics of EPSDT Policy in the 1990s: Policy Entrepreneurs, Political Streams, and Children’s Health Benefits, 76 Milbank Q. 175, 190–92, 197–98 (1998) (describing changes to EPSDT in
light of state autonomy concerns).
107 See Copeland, supra note 12, at 133 (noting that recent administrations have “increasingly
sought to expand state discretion by allowing states to apply for waivers to obtain relief from certain
Medicaid requirements”); Ryan, supra note 12, at 62–64 (describing Medicaid “demonstration waivers” and other “program waivers”).
108 See 42 C.F.R. § 441.300 (2012); Bagenstos, supra note 12, at 11 (describing waiver–based
programs for community–based services to the elderly and disabled).
109 See Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74–271, § 1115, 49 Stat. 690 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 1315(a) (2012)) (giving the Secretary discretion to appropriate funds for experimental
projects not otherwise covered); Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, The Rhetoric Hits the Road: State Challenges to Affordable Care Act Implementation, 46 U. Rich. L. Rev. 781, 790 (2012) (describing Section
1115 waivers).
110 See Are Block Grants the Wave of the Future for Medicaid?, State Health Watch, Sept.
2011, at 1, 2–3 (describing Tennessee and Oregon experiments); Cyril F. Chang, Evolution of
TennCare Yields Valuable Lessons, Managed Care, Nov. 2007, at 45, 47; Daniel M. Fox & Howard M. Leichter, State Model: Oregon: The Ups and Downs of Oregon’s Rationing Plan, 68 Health
Aff., no. 2, 1993, at 66, 66–67, available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/12/2/66.full.
pdf+html?sid=044ce5da–b798–42ac–b5a0–7940f171df59 (discussing Oregon’s “Reform Demonstration” for waiving different Medicaid requirements); Peter D. Jacobson & Rebecca L. Braun, Let
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provides additional administrative and congressional oversight.111 The Balanced
Budget Act of 1997 effectively operates as a blanket waiver, allowing states
to implement Medicaid managed care through state plan amendments, rather
than requiring them to request waivers.112 The evolution of the Medicaid waiver
process and other flexible options are part of a larger trend of federal–state
negotiations over program design and implementation.113 This precedent for
negotiated federalism will be critical for crafting the Red State Narrative.114
Congress enacted another significant change to the Medicaid benefits
package with the Deficit Reduction Act (DRA) of 2005.115 Section 6044 of the
DRA allows states to modify their state plans to provide “benchmark coverage.”116
Significantly, benchmark coverage means that states are no longer required to
provide Medicaid’s signature defined benefits package on an equal basis.117
1000 Flowers Wilt: The Futility of State–Level Health–Care Reform, 55 Kan. L. Rev. 1173, 1185–86
(2007) (describing Massachusetts’s 1996 Section 1115 waiver). For a complete list of current Section
1115 waivers, see Waivers, Medicaid.gov, http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid–CHIP–Program–
Information/By–Topics/Waivers/Waivers.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2014).
111 PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111–148, § 2401, 124 Stat. 119, 297–301 (2010).
112 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396u–2(a) (2012) (allowing states to require Medicaid participants to enroll
in managed care as long as the requirement meets certain conditions).
113 See Bagenstos, supra note 12, at 9–10 (suggesting among other merits of federalism by
waiver, of which Medicaid is one example, that it “provides a mechanism for federal agencies to
engage states before they depart from the strict requirements of funding statutes, to negotiate for
provisions that preserve the key goals . . . and to do so in a context that preserves a measure of
public accountability.”); Ryan, supra note 12, at 58, 62–64 (describing Medicaid as an example of
“policymaking laboratory negotiations”).
114 See infra Part III (discussing negotiations between federal and state authorities post–
NFIB); see also Copeland, supra note 12, at 136 (“Medicaid waivers involved significant ‘bargaining’
and negotiation between state and federal bureaucratic officials”); Ryan, supra note 12, at 63 (“[The
Medicaid waiver] application process is extensively negotiated with the Department of Health and
Human Services, with executive agents on both sides dickering back and forth over proposal terms
before the application receives federal approval.”).
115 Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–171, § 6044(a), 120 Stat. 4, 88–92 (2006)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396u–7 (2012)).
116 42 U.S.C. § 1396u–7(a)(1)(A) (2012) (giving states the option of providing only “benchmark
benefits” to certain populations).
117 Id. “State flexibility in benefit packages,” allows states to modify their plans:
[A] State, at its option as a State plan amendment, may provide for medical
assistance under this subchapter to individuals within one or more groups of
individuals specified by the State through coverage that—
(i) provides benchmark coverage described in subsection (b)(1) or benchmark
equivalent coverage described in subsection (b)(2); and
(ii) for any individual described in section 1396d(a)(4)(B) of this title who is
eligible under the State plan in accordance with paragraphs (10) and (17) of
section 1396a(a) of this title, consists of the items and services described in
section 1396d(a)(4)(B) of this title (relating to early and periodic screening,
diagnostic, and treatment services defined in section 1396d(r) of this title)
and provided in accordance with the requirements of section 1396a(a)(43)
of this title.
Id.
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Benchmark coverage, instead, permits states to enroll Medicaid beneficiaries
in non–Medicaid managed care plans, which by statutory definition include
the Federal Employee Health Benefit Program, state employee health benefit
programs, any plan already offered by a major health maintenance organization
in the state, or any other plan approved by the Secretary.118 Benchmark coverage
was intended to afford “[s]tates unprecedented flexibility within Medicaid State
Plans to provide health benefits coverage.”119 States can require a large portion
of the Medicaid population enroll in benchmark coverage and provide different
benefits within eligibility categories, except with respect to some particularly
vulnerable categories of enrollees, such as dual eligibles, terminally ill hospice
patients, and women in cancer coverage programs.120
Under the DRA, states also have the option to provide “benchmark
equivalent coverage.”121 Benchmark equivalent coverage is less comprehensive
than Medicaid’s traditional benefits package but nevertheless includes inpatient
and outpatient hospital care, physician services, laboratory and x–ray services,
and well–baby care and immunizations.122 Those services must be supplied by an
“actuarial equivalent” of the listed benchmark coverage providers.123 Benchmark
equivalent coverage essentially allows states to operate Medicaid as a defined
contribution, rather than a defined benefits plan.124 Instead of carefully planned,
statutorily designed care and services, states can pay a private insurer who does
not have to comply with the Medicaid Act.125 The benchmark and benchmark–
equivalent options effectively render Medicaid a “premium support” program
that gives private insurers control over access to both benefits and providers,
without attendant accountability.126
118 § 1396u–7(b)(1).
119 Medicaid Program; State Flexibility for Medicaid Benefit Packages, 73 Fed. Reg. 9715, 9715
(proposed Feb. 22, 2008) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 440).
120 42 U.S.C. § 1396u–7(a)(2)(B) (2012). Groups exempted from enrollment in a benchmark
plan include pregnant women; blind and disabled individuals; dual eligibles; terminally ill individuals; people residing in hospitals, nursing facilities, intermediate care facilities for the mentally
retarded, or other medical institutions; and individuals who are medically frail or have special needs.
See 42 C.F.R. § 440.315 (2012) (including the following additional groups for exemption from enrollment in a benchmark plan: youth in foster care or receiving adoption assistance, youth with
serious emotional disturbance, people with disabling mental disorders, individuals with serious and
complex medical conditions, and individuals with physical and/or mental disabilities that significantly prevent them from performing one or more activities of daily living).
121 42 U.S.C. § 1396u–7(a)(1)(A), (b)(2) (2012).
122 § 1396u–7(b)(2)(A).
123 § 1396u–7(b)(2)(B)–(C). A qualified actuary must make the determination of actuarial
equivalency, taking into account certain factors. § 1396u–7(b)(3).
124 See Jonathan Barry Forman, Public Pensions: Choosing Between Defined Benefit and Defined
Contribution Plans, Mich. St. L. Rev. 187, 188 n.2 (1999).
125 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396u–7 (2012).
126 See Rosenbaum, Medicaid at Forty, supra note 78, at 41 (“A premium support approach
. . . entitles individual to, at most, a defined contribution toward health coverage, with almost
total discretion over actual benefit design left to insurer discretion rather than legally enforceable
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For the newly eligible population under the ACA, states may provide
the traditional Medicaid defined benefit package, but they are required only
to provide benchmark or benchmark equivalent coverage127 in accordance
with the DRA definition.128 The DRA exemptions for certain vulnerable
beneficiaries continue to apply to the Medicaid expansion population under
the ACA.129 In other words, Chief Justice Roberts’s conclusion in NFIB, that
the ACA expansion population would have a “new” set of benefits is erroneous;
the expansion population would receive either the traditional Medicaid benefits
package or a DRA–consistent benchmark package, just like currently eligible
enrollees.
The ACA does revise the DRA requirements in a few respects. These changes
are applicable to all Medicaid beneficiaries under such plans, not just the ACA
expansion population. First, benchmark and benchmark–equivalent benefits
must include, at minimum, the package of “essential health benefits,” as defined
in the ACA. Accordingly, Medicaid beneficiaries covered under the DRA
definition will receive the same package of benefits now required for individual
and small group insurance plans sold inside and outside of the exchanges.130
The ACA further specifies that benchmark or benchmark equivalent plans
provide medical and surgical benefits, including treatment of mental health
and substance abuse disorders, as well as comply with federal laws relating to
mental health and substance abuse parity.131 In addition, benchmark–equivalent
packages now must cover prescription drugs and mental health services,132
and both benchmark and benchmark–equivalent packages must cover family
planning services and supplies.133
Despite those changes to the DRA’s benchmark definition, the ACA’s
benefit package does not effect a constitutionally significant change to the
existing Medicaid program. Variable coverage among Medicaid beneficiaries
already exists, as seen with comparing children under EPSDT to adult enrollees
and comparing states’ benchmark plans to the traditional package of benefits.
Moreover, Section 1115 waivers and other amendments have long allowed
states to vary the coverage and employ private managed care plans to deliver
benefits to Medicaid enrollees. The ACA’s benefits package should not be
viewed as different in kind.

standards . . . .”).”).
127 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(k)(1), 1396u–7(b)(5), 18022(b) (2012).
128 42 C.F.R. §§ 440.330, 440.335 (defining benchmark coverage and benchmark equivalent
coverage, respectively) (2012).
129 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396u–7(a)(2)(B) (2012); 42 C.F.R. § 440.315 (2012).
130 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396u–7(b)(5), 18022 (2012) (defining essential health benefits package).
131 42 U.S.C. § 1396u–7(b)(6)(A) (excluding those offered by Medicaid managed care organizations).
132 § 1396u–7(b)(2)(A).
133 § 1396u–7(b)(7).
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3. Medicaid Funding Structure.—Chief Justice Roberts’s third rationale for
deeming the ACA amendments as “new” Medicaid concerned the funding
structure. The ACA retains the essential cooperative federalism approach
but shifts the weight of the financial obligation to the federal government.
This change should make the program more, not less, consistent with states’
traditional authority and discretion and, therefore, well within the federal
spending power.
As the Supreme Court has previously noted, financial contribution by
both the states and the federal government is the “cornerstone of Medicaid.”134
Through open–ended funding, states receive uncapped federal financial support
for every state dollar spent. This arrangement incentivizes states to provide
generous financial public benefits while the federal government shifts a portion
of the funding burden to states.135 Medicaid, however, is entirely voluntary.136
States do not have to participate and could refuse federal dollars, choosing
instead to either establish their own indigent health care programs or elect not
to provide any medical assistance to low–income individuals.137 All fifty states
now accept federal funding to operate state Medicaid programs.138
As a condition of participation, states must submit a “state plan” to the federal
agency.139 The state plan explains how the state will comply with mandatory
elements of Medicaid and identifies the optional elements that it may seek
to utilize.140 As noted above, states can also request waivers from some or all
Medicaid requirements or operate their state Medicaid plans as managed care
programs.141 Once the state plan is in place and approved by federal authorities,
states administer Medicaid with relatively little federal oversight.142
Each dollar a state spends on federally approved Medicaid programs,
whether required or optional, is matched by federal funds on a percentage
basis.143 The federal match ranges from 50% to just over 73%, based on the
amount of money the state spends on Medicaid and the state’s per capita

134 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 308 (1980).
135 Leonard, Rhetorical Federalism, supra note 53, at 134–35.
136 See Harris, 448 U.S. at 301 (“Although participation in the Medicaid program is entirely
optional, once a State elects to participate, it must comply with the requirements of [the Medicaid
Act].”).
137 See Kinney, supra note 81, at 857, 860.
138 Leonard, Rhetorical Federalism, supra note 53, at 135.
139 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (2012) (defining compliance requirements necessary to create and run
a State Plan).
140 Id.; Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, supra note 57, at 447.
141 42 U.S.C. § 1396n (2012).
142 Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, supra note 57, at 447.
143 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396b (2012); see also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 308 (1980) (describing
this system of matching state expenditures with federal funds as a “cooperative federalism” approach enacted “to provide federal financial assistance for all legitimate state expenditures under an
approved Medicaid plan”).

2013– 2014 ]

the red state option

401

income.144 In addition, states receive a federal match of at least 50% for the
administrative costs of running the state Medicaid program.145
The ACA in no way alters the fundamental Medicaid funding arrangement.
The only change is to place a much greater share of the funding onus on the
federal government,146 and that change is notably much more favorable to
states. Compared to traditional federal Medicaid matching rates of 50% to just
over 73%,147 under the ACA the federal government will match state spending
on newly eligible beneficiaries at no less than 90%.148 For the first three years
of Medicaid expansion, 2014 to 2016, the federal government will pay 100%
of the cost of newly eligible beneficiaries in all states.149 Thereafter, the federal
percentage phases down gradually, from 95% in 2017, to 90% in 2020 and
perpetually thereafter.150 The more generous federal match only applies to the
newly covered population.151 States that previously expanded their Medicaid
plans to cover any portion of the newly eligible population will also receive
the enhanced match, meaning that those states may actually experience a
savings as a result of the ACA’s Medicaid expansion.152 States are also eligible
to receive an enhanced 90% match for some administrative costs associated
with expansion.153
144 Federal Medicaid Assistance Percentage (FMAP) calculations are published in the Federal Register each year. See Federal Financial Participation in State Assistance Expenditures for
Various Medicaid Programs 2013–2014, 77 Fed. Reg. 71,420 (Nov. 30, 2012), available at http://www.
gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR–2012–11–30/pdf/2012–29035.pdf.
145 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(a) (2012) (listing the percentage of the state spending the federal
government will match depending on the type of expenditure) [hereinafter 2013–14 FMAP Calculations].
146 See John Holahan & Irene Headen, Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid & the Uninsured, The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Medicaid Coverage and Spending in Health
Reform: National and State–by–State Results for Adults at or Below 133% FPL 1,
2 (May 1, 2010), available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/medicaid–
coverage–and–spending–in–health–reform–national–and–state–by–state–results–for–adults–at–
or–below–133–fpl.pdf (estimating that 95% of new spending will be by the federal government).
147 See 2013–14 FMAP Calculations, 77 Fed. Reg. at 71,420 (citing current FMAP).
148 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(y)(1) (2012). CHIP also has a very generous federal match, which helped
to create the precedent for the ACA’s enhanced match. See 42 U.S.C. § 1397ee(a)(1) (2012) (promising that the Secretary will pay the state an amount matching the amount of the FMAP for certain
expenditures).
149 42 U.S.C. § 1397d(y)(1) (2012).
150 Id.
151 Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, supra note 57, at 451.
152 See Holahan & Headen, supra note 146, at 4 (citing Massachusetts as one state that will
experience savings under the Medicaid expansion).
153 U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO–12–821, Medicaid Expansion: States’ Implementation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 13–14 (2012), available at http://www.
gao.gov/assets/600/593210.pdf; Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Dep’t of Health
& Human Servs., Frequently Asked Questions on Exchanges, Market Reforms, and
Medicaid 13 (Dec. 10, 2012), http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Files/Downloads/exchanges–faqs–12–10–2012.pdf [hereinafter FAQ, Dec. 10, 2012] (affirming availability of 90% federal

402

Kentucky Law Journal

[Vol. 102

Deeper discussion of the federalism implications of NFIB than this Article
offers is necessary to fully assess the states’ argument that more generous federal
funding operates as unconstitutional coercion. But suffice to say that Chief
Justice Roberts’s reliance on the funding arrangement as evidence of a “shift
in kind” is dubious. Just as Congress is free to amend the Medicaid statute
to include additional beneficiaries and different packages of benefits, it is free
to vary the financial terms. More importantly, the fact that the ACA does so
in a way that is exceptionally favorable to states simply does not suggest any
constitutional infirmity.
The Court’s fundamental misappreciation of the history and operation
of the Medicaid program, and mischaracterization of the effect of the ACA
amendments on the program, resulted in a misguided decision. Because the
Court concluded that the ACA creates a “new” program, on which states’ “old”
Medicaid dollars could not be conditioned, the solution was to treat Medicaid
expansion as an option, rather than a mandatory requirement, for participating
states.
The potential effect of this decision is that substantial portions of the
anticipated new Medicaid population will be left out of the ACA’s coverage
plan.154 Under the congressional design, currently uninsured adults below 138%
FPL would become Medicaid eligible.155 Currently uninsured adults between
100% and 400% FPL would be eligible for federal subsidies to purchase private
health insurance on the exchanges.156 Now, in opt–out states, uninsured adults
below 100% FPL will be without both Medicaid coverage and federal assistance

matching funds for new eligibility systems that states develop to accommodate adjusted gross income calculations and coordinate with exchanges).
154 See Huberfeld et al., supra note 6, at 85–86 (discussing coverage gap); Benjamin D. Sommers & Arnold M. Epstein, U.S. Governors and the Medicaid Expansion – No Quick Resolution
in Sight, 368 New Eng. J. Med. 496, 499 (Feb. 7, 2013), available at http://www.nejm.org/doi/
full/10.1056/NEJMp1215785 (noting that, even with tax credits available to those above 100% FPL,
“[the PPACA] will still leave millions of adults living below the poverty level without health insurance and without the means of acquiring it”); Robin Rudowitz & Jessica Stephens, Kaiser
Comm’n on Medicaid & the Uninsured, The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Analyzing
the Impact of State Medicaid Expansion Decisions 5, 6 fig.10 ( July 17, 2013), available at
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/07/8458–analyzing–the–impact–of–state–
medicaid–expansion–decisions2.pdf (estimating that over five million people would remain uninsured due to state decisions not to insure); see also Sally Tyler, Opting for a Medicaid Donut Hole
Makes State Budgets the Biggest Loser, AFSCME Blog (Sept. 7, 2012), http://www.afscme.org/
blog/opting–for–a–medicaid–donut–hole–makes–state–budgets–the–biggest–loser (“[I]n states
that opt out, the Medicaid donut hole is born.”); Explaining the Coverage Gap, Healthy Debate
Georgia, http://healthyfuturega.org/archives/4531 (last visited Jan. 8, 2014) (“If Georgia fails to
adopt this expansion, this would create a ‘coverage gap,’ leaving many Georgians with no options
for affordable health coverage.”).
155 See supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text.
156 See PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111–148, §§ 1401, 10105, 124 Stat. 119, 213, 906 (2010) (codified as
amended at I.R.C. § 36B (2012)) (providing premium assistance tax credits for purchasing qualified
health plans).
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to purchase their own insurance.157 The potential effect of this Medicaid
“donut hole” has yet to be fully calculated, but state–by–state projections are
staggering.158
III. Room for Negotiation
As crafted by the Court, Medicaid expansion under the ACA operates as a
binary choice, an on–off switch, not a starting point for negotiations between
individual states and the Secretary of HHS.159 But as soon as the decision was
announced, states approached the matter as just that: An invitation to strike
a deal with the federal government.160 To be sure, flexibility has become a
common feature of the modern Medicaid program, with various options for
states to negotiate, including Section 1115 and other waivers from otherwise
applicable Medicaid requirements.161 But neither the ACA nor NFIB expressly
authorizes flexible implementation by states.
The Administration’s initial position on Medicaid expansion post–NFIB
suggested maximum flexibility.162 There was no timeline for implementation;
states could opt into or out of expansion at any time. By contrast, the ACA
157 Some states to cover childless adults up to a very low FPL. See Sommers & Epstein, supra
note 154, at 499 (“[L]ow–income adults in at least a dozen states remain ineligible for any kind of
public subsidy for health insurance.”). See generally The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Adult
Income Eligibility Limits at Application as a Percent of the Federal Poverty Level
(FPL), January 2013, http://kff.org/medicaid/state–indicator/income–eligibility–low–income–
adults/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2014) (reporting state–by–state coverage statistics).
158 See Rudowitz & Stephens, supra note 154, at 4 fig.5 (depicting coverage gap); id. at 6
fig.10 (estimating over five million people in opt–out states will fall in coverage gap).
159 See Ryan, supra note 12, at 4 (suggesting negotiated federalism as “offer[ing] a means of
understanding the relationship between state and federal power that differs from the stylized model
of zero–sum federalism dominating political discourse, which emphasizes winner–takes–all jurisdictional competition”).
160 Letter from Dan Crippen, Nat’l Governors Ass’n, to Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t
of Health & Human Servs. ( July 2, 2012), available at http://www.nga.org/cms/home/federal–relations/nga–letters/executive–committee–letters/col2–content/main–content–list/july–2–2012–letter–––affordable.html (inquiring regarding partial Medicaid implementation, phased–in implementation, and other alternatives to expansion); Sommers & Epstein, supra note 154, at 499 (noting
that several state governors petitioned HHS to allow partial expansions).
161 See supra notes 107–14 (discussing waiver and private managed care options under Medicaid); Copeland, supra note 12, at 135 (“Medicaid waivers have played a significant role in the transformation of Medicaid for nearly two decades.”); Ryan, supra note 12, at 64 (listing various examples
of states’ Medicaid waivers).
162 Letter from Kathleen Sebelius, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., to State
Governors ( July 10, 2012), available at http://capsules.kaiserhealthnews.org/wp–content/uploads/2012/07/Secretary–Sebelius–Letter–to–the–Governors–071012.pdf (emphasizing commitment “to providing states with as much flexibility as we can to achieve successful implementation”
and emphasizing that the Supreme Court’s Medicaid decision “did not affect other provisions of
the law,” including the fact “that states have flexibility to design the benefit package for individuals
covered”); CBO, July 2012, supra note 55, at 8, 10 (noting that “final regulatory guidance is not yet
available” regarding possible flexibility in expansion below 138% FPL, or to only specific subsets of
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specifies particular implementation deadlines for states electing to establish
state–based health insurance exchanges.163 The Secretary of HHS at first seemed
open to partial implementation with respect to the expansion population.
States might be allowed to expand not all the way up to the statutory 138%
FPL, or to vary income–level eligibility for different portions of the new
population of beneficiaries. The Administration, however, later retreated from
these suggestions, making it clear that opting–in states must include the entire
expansion population up to the statutorily specified level.164 Flexibility on the
election date and free movement in and out of the program remain.165 The
Secretary also indicated that states would have flexibility regarding benchmark
plans, different benefit packages for different populations, and cost–sharing
requirements.166
In large part, the Administration has hewed the maximum flexibility line,
in an apparent attempt to bring as many recalcitrant states on board as possible.
The present high–water mark for flexibility is the Secretary’s approval of
Arkansas’s plan to cover its entire Medicaid expansion population under private
plans purchased on the new health insurance exchanges.167 Arkansas was the
start of a trend, with other Red States requesting similar deals or watching
those developments closely before making their next moves.168
Under the Arkansas arrangement, the state would receive the ACA’s
generous federal funding at 100% for three years, followed by 90% perpetually,
just like other expansion states.169 But the federal dollars would go toward the
cost of private plans to be sold on Arkansas’s health insurance exchanges—the
very same exchange plans that the rest of the individually insured population
will be eligible to purchase under the ACA.170 While the notion of Medicaid
the expansion population and anticipating that “many states will try to work out arrangements with
[HHS] to undertake partial expansions”).
163 See Building the Health Insurance Marketplace, Nat’l Conference of State Legs., http://
www.ncsl.org/issues–research/health/american–health–benefit–exchanges.aspx#keydates (updated
Aug. 21, 2013) (summarizing key exchange implementation dates).
164 FAQ, Dec. 10, 2012, supra note 153, at 12 (responding, “no,” to a question asking whether
states could expand to less than 133% FPL and still receive 100% federal matching funds”).
165 Id. at 11 (affirming that “there is no deadline by which a state must let the federal government know its intention regarding the Medicaid expansion”).
166 Id. at 12; see also Medicaid and the Affordable Care Act: Premium Assistance, Medicaid.
gov (Mar. 2013), http://medicaid.gov/Federal–Policy–Guidance/Downloads/FAQ–03–29–13–Premium–Assistance.pdf (noting various options for states to pay for Medicaid enrollees private group
coverage premiums, while still requiring states to ensure the same cost–sharing and coverage requirements as Medicaid) [hereinafter Premium Assistance FAQs].).
167 See infra Part III.C.2 (describing the Arkansas plan).
168 Baker, supra note 14 (“Several other states have been closely watching Arkansas’s progress.”).
169 Id.; Johnson, supra note 14; see supra notes 148–53 and accompanying text.
170 States were given the option to operate their own exchanges, to allow the federal government to do so, or to establish an exchange in partnership with the federal government. “Arkansas
has moved quickly to define its role in a partnership exchange, focusing on maintaining flexibility
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benefits being delivered through private plans is not new, it is novel to throw
Medicaid beneficiaries into the mix of an emerging commercial market to
purchase their own plans.171 In essence, the Arkansas arrangement operates as a
government–funded voucher for Medicaid recipients. Other states’ negotiations
with federal officials received less media attention, but are similarly instructive
for understanding how reluctant states might come around to accepting
Medicaid expansion.172
This Article delineates the “Red State Narrative,” meaning the arguments
that ultimately stand a good chance of convincing Red State legislators and
governors to opt into Medicaid expansion. This Article concludes that states
that have invested so long and so deeply in anti–Obamacare rhetoric, steadfastly
refusing even the slightest appearance of support for the comprehensive federal
reform package, can find a way to accept the generous federal dollars without
losing political face.
I write as a resident of Georgia, one of these Red States, where even the
Georgia Hospital Association long remained agnostic on the merits of Medicaid
expansion in our state.173 According to various sources, Medicaid expansion
would be a financial win–win for Georgia.174 Health policy and consumer
advocacy groups estimate that Medicaid expansion would cover approximately
and control over insurance plan selection, rating, monitoring and consumer assistance functions
including, outreach, education, and an In–person Assister program.” The Henry J. Kaiser Family
Found., State Exchange Profile: Arkansas (last updated Oct. 29, 2013), http://kff.org/health–
reform/state–profile/state–exchange–profiles–arkansas.
171 See Rosenbaum & Sommers, The Great New Experiment, supra note 15, at 8 (emphasizing
that “moving Medicaid beneficiaries into a new and untested marketplace raises large challenges
even as it creates important opportunities”).
172 See generally infra Part III.C (describing various states’ experiences with Medicaid expansion).
173 Andy Miller, Georgia Hospital Officials Muted on Medicaid Expansion, Athens Banner–
Herald (last updated May 5, 2013, 8:17 PM), http://onlineathens.com/local–news/2013–05–04/
georgia–hospital–officials–muted–medicaid–expansion.
174 See, e.g., John Holahan et al., Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid & the Uninsured, The
Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., The Cost and Coverage Implications of the ACA Medicaid Expansion: National and State–by–State Analysis 8 tbl.ES–1 (Nov. 1, 2012), http://
kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8384.pdf (estimating a 45.1% increase, or $37.9
billion, in federal funding under Medicaid expansion); Andy Miller, Studies Point to Savings Under Medicaid Expansion, Augusta Chronicle ( July 25, 2013), http://chronicle.augusta.com/news/
health/2013–07–25/studies–point–savings–under–medicaid–expansion; Tony Pugh, Despite Health
Challenges, Southern States Resist Medicaid Expansion, McClatchy (Apr. 11, 2013), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/04/11/188297/health–challenged–southern–states.html (noting that Georgia
would receive a 38.1% increase, or $33.7 billion, in federal funding under Medicaid expansion); William S. Custer, The Economic Impact of Medicaid Expansion in Georgia, Pub. No. 74, Healthcare
Ga. Found. 4 (2013), http://www.healthcaregeorgia.org/uploads/file/Economic_Impact_Medicaid_GA(1).pdf (estimating that Medicaid expansion would bring additional $40.5 billion federal
dollars to Georgia over 2014 to 2023 and add over 70,000 new jobs, resulting in $8.2 billion additional economic output and $276.5 million additional tax revenue); Timothy Sweeney, Report:
Medicaid Expansion Good for Georgia Workers, Ga. Budget & Policy Inst. Blog ( July 19, 2013),
http://gbpi.org/report–medicaid–expansion–good–for–georgia–workers.
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700,000 currently uninsured people175 and bring $15 billion more federal
dollars into the state’s health care system over the first five years of expansion.176
The state would face a mere two percent increase in current state Medicaid
spending. 177 Yet even in the face of such compelling economic arguments in
favor of expansion, Georgia’s leaders remain steadfastly opposed.178 If economic
self–interest cannot convince states to come on board, what argument can?
The impact of states’ decisions not to expand Medicaid will become apparent
over the next several years as the health insurance exchanges and other key
provisions of the ACA take effect. In states like Georgia, the decision to opt
out will result in a significant portion of the population becoming ineligible not
only for Medicaid, but also for federal subsidies to purchase private insurance
on the exchanges. Yet those individuals will still be subject to the tax penalties
for failing to comply with the ACA’s individual mandate.179 In Georgia, this
Medicaid “donut hole” could encompass as many as half a million residents.180
A. Arguments Against Medicaid Expansion
In order to construct a Red State Narrative, it is helpful first to understand
the arguments that must be overcome. In early 2013, the New England Journal
of Medicine published an incisive summary of state lawmakers’ expressed
reasons for opting out of, or remaining undecided about, Medicaid expansion.181
These objections include financial, public policy, and federalism concerns.

175 State Implications of Health Reform in Georgia, Ga. Health Policy Ctr. 1 fig.1 (May
3, 2010), https://aysps.gsu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/ghpc/State_Implications_of_Health_
Reform_in_Georgia%282%29.pdf (including expansion to children, adults with children, and
childless adults); Amanda Ptashkin, Presentation, The Affordable Care Act: What’s in it for You and
Your Patients?, Georgians for a Healthy Future, slide 28 (Oct. 29, 2012), http://healthyfuturega.org/pdfs/swog.pdf.
176 Id. at slide 33.
177 Explaining Medicaid, Medicaid 101, Cover Georgia, http://www.coverga.org/medicaid101/medicaid101.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2014) (estimating a 2% increase representing $714 million in new state spending); see also Ptashkin, supra note 175, at slide 27 (estimating a 2.7% increase
in state Medicaid spending above baseline without expansion).
178 See Pugh, supra note 174 (summarizing view of nine contiguous Southern states, including
Georgia, saying they cannot afford Medicaid expansion under the 90% federal funding arrangement); Kyle Wingfield, Deal: No Medicaid Expansion for Georgia, Atlanta Journal–Const. (Aug.
28, 2012, 12:49 PM), http://blogs.ajc.com/kyle–wingfield/2012/08/28/deal–no–medicaid–expansion–for–georgia/ (internal quotation marks omitted) (reporting that Governor Nation Deal said
he had “no intentions of expanding Medicaid” and, at a cost of $4.5 billion over 10 years, felt that
expansion “ (“‘is something our state cannot afford”).
179 Tammy Luhby, States Forego Billions by Opting out of Medicaid Expansion, CNNMoney
( July 1, 2013), http://money.cnn.com/2013/07/01/news/economy/medicaid–expansion–states/index.
html.
180 See Ptashkin, supra note 175, at slide 30 (estimating 534,000 would remain ineligible for
exchange subsidies or Medicaid/CHIP if state declines expansion).
181 Sommers & Epstein, supra note 154, at 496.
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The two most commonly cited reasons were concern about the impact of
Medicaid expansion on state budgets182 and the related concern that states would
have to raise taxes in order to pay for the expansion.183 In Georgia, for example,
analysis suggests that Medicaid expansion would cost the state between $2.5
and $4.5 billion.184 Relatively speaking, that is very small amount compared the
federal dollars Georgia would receive under expansion.185 But it is still more
than state lawmakers believe the state budget can support.186 These objections
must be understood as suggesting that states like Georgia do not contemplate
an alternative, fully state–funded program for currently uninsured low–income
residents. Given the very generous federal funding extended under the ACA, a
state–based approach to cover the entire Medicaid expansion population would
almost certainly result in an even larger impact on the state budget.
Lawmakers also expressed concern that Medicaid expansion would
adversely impact state budgets by increasing the costs of covering not only newly
eligible beneficiaries, but also currently eligible beneficiaries. This “woodwork
effect” is associated with the ACA’s Medicaid outreach efforts and enrollment
simplification.187 This argument reveals state lawmakers’ fundamental reluctance
to support government welfare programs and their preference for keeping
Medicaid rolls down through de facto under–enrollment.
Another manifestation of state lawmakers’ budgetary concerns is revealed
in their initial interest in partial Medicaid expansion. If states could expand
Medicaid up to only 100%, rather than the statutory 138% FPL, they could
offset even more costs onto the federal government. That is because under the
ACA, federal tax credits to purchase private insurance on the exchanges are
available for people between 100% and 400% FPL.188 Accordingly, if states
could expand their Medicaid programs only up to 100%, anyone above that

182 Id. at 498 (finding that 92% of governors opposing Medicaid expansion expressed concerns
about impact on state budget).
183 Id. (noting that just over half of governors expressed concerns that states would have to
raise taxes to pay for expansion).
184 Max Blau, This Georgia Hospital Shows Why Rejecting Medicaid Isn’t Easy, Wash. Post
Wonkblog ( June 26, 2013, 3:24 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/
wp/2013/06/26/this–georgia–hospital–shows–why–rejecting–medicaid–isnt–easy/ (reporting state
cost estimates cited by Governor Deal); see Wingfield, supra note 177 (same).
185 Blau, supra note 184 (reporting that Georgia stands to receive $33 billion over a decade
should it choose to accept Medicaid expansion).
186 Id. (citing Governor Deal’s response to cost estimates); see Wingfield, supra note 178 (quoting Governor Deal).
187 See Sommers & Epstein, supra note 154, at 498 (noting that some governors “pointed to
the so–called woodwork effect, in which the ACA could draw previously eligible but unenrolled
persons into Medicaid, at greater cost to the state”); CBO, July 2012, supra note 55, at 9 (noting that
states, and the CBO, expect an “increase in enrollment among those who would have been eligible
under prior law and would not qualify for the higher federal matching rates”).
188 I.R.C. § 36B(c)(1)(A) (2012) (providing for premium assistance tax credits for purchase of
qualified health plans).
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level, up to 400% FPL, would be eligible for federally funded tax credits.189
Accordingly, at least that marginal group between 100% FPL and 138% FPL
would be covered on the federal government’s, not the states’, tab.
Setting aside budgetary concerns, other objections to Medicaid expansion
stem from broader state resistance to federal health reform, most saliently
expressed in states’ legal challenges to the constitutionality of the individual
mandate and Medicaid expansion.190 States’ lawsuits were grounded in the
Tenth Amendment and federalism principles regarding the proper scope of
federal vis–à–vis state power.191 Many opting–out states simply do not want to
give up control and be subject to further federal oversight into areas that they
consider more properly the realm of traditional state authority.192 Under this
view, lawmakers’ objections are not so much to Medicaid in particular, but to
the expansion of federal programs in general.
Several state lawmakers doubted whether the federal government would
actually honor its generous offer of federal matching dollars under the
terms prescribed in the ACA.193 States’ existing Federal Medical Assistance
Percentage (FMAP) is determined annually, based on the relative poverty
level of participating states, with 50% federal match being the minimum.194
The ACA’s considerably more generous 100% and phased–down 90% federal
funding does not contemplate adjustments or federal agency discretion over the
funding level.195 Accordingly, it seems that an act of Congress, quite literally,
would be required for federal funding to be reduced. Given the great hurdles
Congress surmounted to enact the ACA in the first place, and the multiple
189 See Sommers & Epstein, supra note 154, at 499 (discussing states’ interest in partial expansion).
190 See Steven Schwinn, The ACA and the Tenth Amendment, SCOTUSblog, (Aug. 5, 2011, 1:38
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/08/the–aca–and–the–tenth–amendment/. Proponents of
ACA find such constitutional arguments to lack any real merit; Pugh, supra note 174 (quoting Joan
Alker, co–executive director of the Center for Children and Families at Georgetown University)
(“The opposition is purely ideological. It’s the tea party faction of the Republican Party.”).
191 See Schwinn, supra note 190.
192 See Sommers & Epstein, supra note 154, at 498 (citing governors’ concerns about lack of
state flexibility). Curiously, however, many of the states that refuse Medicaid expansion on federalism grounds also refuse to establish state–based health insurance exchanges, with the result being
that their exchanges will be established and administered by the federal government. That approach
cedes considerable authority over state insurance markets to federal authorities, contrary to the
Tenth Amendment rhetoric.
193 See id. at 498–99 (noting that more than half of governors opposing expansion “predicted
that the federal government would renege on the generous terms of the ACA”).
194 Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid and the Uninsured, The Henry J. Kaiser Family
Found., Medicaid Financing: An Overview of the Federal Medicaid Matching Rate
(FMAP) 1–2 (2012), available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8352.
pdf; see also 2013–14 FMAP Calculations , 77 Fed. Reg. 71,420 (Nov. 30, 2012), http://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/FR–2012–11–30/pdf/2012–29035.pdf (citing notice of the current year’s FMAP calculations in the Federal Register).
195 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(y)(1) (2012).

2013– 2014 ]

the red state option

409

failed attempts to repeal all or part of the law, it is hard to imagine that such
a Medicaid funding amendment would be viable. Nevertheless, a number of
states that eventually agreed to Medicaid expansion included “circuit breakers”
or other provisions in their legislation, which would automatically repeal or
call for reconsideration of the state expansion legislation, should the federal
funding level change.196
Other objections express fundamental policy disagreements regarding
government assistance and individual responsibility. Opposing state leaders and
representatives described the Medicaid program as “broken”197 and the entire
notion of public entitlements as fostering dependency.198 Several governors
oppose Medicaid expansion based on the belief that it is bad policy to funnel
more money, federal or state, into a failing public program.199 Objections to the
Medicaid program, or public entitlements generally, obviously go beyond the
specific issue of whether to expand Medicaid to a new group of beneficiaries.
It bears emphasis, however, that through their participation in the existing
Medicaid program these states have already expressed some support for publicly
funded health care for certain groups.
Several state lawmakers effectively dodged the question, citing uncertainty
and need for more information as their reasons for opting out of Medicaid
expansion at this time.200 The wait–and–see approach is defensible; there are
certainly many unanswered questions about how Medicaid expansion will work,
how much it will cost, and how effectively it will provide essential medical care
to enrollees. A number of states are waiting in the wings to see how things
unfold and what other alternatives to expansion, such as the Arkansas plan, may
become available.201
196 See, e.g., Fernanda Santos, Medicaid Expansion is Delicate Maneuver for Arizona’s Republican Governor, N.Y. Times ( Jan. 19, 2013), www.nytimes.com/2013/01/20/us/politics/medicaid–
expansion–is–delicate–maneuver–for–arizona–governor.html (“[Arizona governor Jan Brewer’s
expansion] plan includes a ‘circuit breaker’ to automatically freeze coverage for childless adults
if the federal government drops its share of matching funds below 80 percent.”); Kyle Cheney,
Chris Christie Takes Obamacare Medicaid Expansion, Politico (Feb. 26, 2013, 1:20 PM), http://www.
politico.com/story/2013/02/chris–christie–to–take–obamacare–medicaid–expansion–88105.html
(“[New Jersey governor Chris] Christie promised to withdraw his support if Washington reneges
on its commitment. ‘If that ever changes because of adverse actions by the Obama administration
or broken promises, I will end it as quickly as it started,’ he said.”).
197 Sommers & Epstein, supra note 154, at 498 (“[Governor] Rick Perry (R–TX) said that
adding uninsured Texans to Medicaid is ‘not unlike adding a thousand people to the Titanic.’”).
198 Id. (“[Governor] Dennis Daugaard (R–SD) declared that ‘able–bodied adults should be
self–reliant’ . . . .”).
199 See, e.g., Pugh, supra note 174 (quoting spokesman for Mississippi governor Phil Bryant)
(“From 2003 to 2012, Mississippi spent more than $9 billion on Medicaid and the state’s poor health
indicators have remained unchanged or worsened . . . . ‘So why would we throw even more money
we don’t have at the issue and expect some miraculous change in outcomes?’”).
200 Sommers & Epstein, supra note 154, at 498 tbl.2 (three–quarters of undecided governors
cited need for more information).
201 See, e.g., Georgia Studying Medicaid Expansion Options, Athens Banner–Herald (May
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B. Arguments for Medicaid Expansion
A number of arguments, including financial, social welfare, morality, and
public health, favor Medicaid expansion. As suggested in the Introduction,
the strongest, seemingly irrefutable, argument in favor of Medicaid expansion
is economic.202 Congress surely expected the generous federal funding for
Medicaid expansion to incentivize states to opt in.203 A recent RAND
simulation estimated that the fourteen opt–out states would forgo a total of
$8.4 billion in federal funding and would spend an additional $1 billion in
uncompensated care costs by not expanding their Medicaid programs.204
Various special interest and policy groups have conducted state–specific
analyses demonstrating the net benefits of accepting federal funding for
Medicaid expansion.205 For example, West Virginia’s Governor Earl Ray
Tomblin hired an actuarial firm and two health economists to model the impact
of insurance exchange implementation and Medicaid expansion.206 Expansion
in that state would add about 91,500 low–income residents to Medicaid,
bringing $5.2 billion in new federal funding while costing the state a relatively
modest $375.5 million.207 Armed with this data, Tomblin became one of the
latest Democratic governors to accept Medicaid expansion.208
22, 2013), http://onlineathens.com/local–news/2013–05–22/georgia–studying–medicaid–expansion–options (noting that state budget analysts are assessing the financial impact of expansion and
studying various models, including the novel Arkansas approach).
202 See, e.g., Holahan et al., supra note 174, at 5 & fig.ES–3 (indicating that incremental cost
of expansion for states would be $8 billion (0.3% increase), compared to incremental cost to federal
government of $800 billion (21% increase) over 2013–2022 period); Rudowitz & Stephens, supra
note 154, at 7 (estimating that twenty–one opting–out states would forgo $345.9 billion in federal
funds over 2013–2022 period); Price & Eibner, supra note 5, at 1033 (noting that fourteen opting–out
states would forgo $8.4 billion in federal payments); Luhby, supra note 179 (quoting Urban Institute’s John Holahan) (“You can’t make an economic case against expansion.”).
203 CBO, July 2012, supra note 55, at 9 (“One significant incentive for states to undertake the
Medicaid expansion . . . is that the federal government is scheduled to cover a very large share of
the costs of that expansion.”).
204 Price & Eibner, supra note 5, at 1033–34.
205 See Abby Goodnough & Robert Pear, Governors Fall away in G.O.P. Opposition to More
Medicaid, N.Y. Times (Feb. 21, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/22/us/politics/gop–governors–providing–a–lift–for–health–law.html (“Every few days, state hospital associations and advocates for poor people issue reports asserting that the economic benefits of expanding Medicaid
would outweigh the costs. In recent weeks, such reports have been issued in Idaho, Indiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Texas, Virginia and Wisconsin.”).
206 Margaret Newkirk & Mark Niquette, West Virginia Governor Backs Medicaid Expansion
for Poor, Bloomberg (May 2, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013–05–02/west–virginia–
governor–backs–medicaid–expansion–for–poor.html.
207 Id.
208 See Sy Mukherjee, West Virginia Accepts Medicaid Expansion as Time Runs Out for Other Highly–Uninsured States, ThinkProgress (May 2, 2013, 2:55 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/
health/2013/05/02/1954191/west–virginia–will–expand–medicaid/; Newkirk & Niquette, supra note
206.
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Likewise, in Ohio, a “decisive factor” in Republican Governor John Kasich’s
decision to support Medicaid expansion was a health policy study demonstrating
that the economic benefits of expansion outweigh the costs to the state.209 The
Ohio study, prepared by The Ohio State University, the Health Policy Institute
of Ohio, and the Urban Institute and Regional Economic Models, was “a major
watershed moment,” allowing Medicaid expansion proponents to reframe the
issue as improving both the state budget and economy, while extending coverage
to more than 455,000 people.210 After months of lobbying by religious, health
care, and business groups, the release of the study finally shifted Governor
Kasich in favor of expansion.211
There are many ways to measure the estimated costs and savings from
Medicaid expansion. Some studies consider only the expected federal
funding.212 Other models include savings from reducing state programming
aimed at the indigent, such as mental health counseling, substance abuse
treatment, uncompensated care funding, and public health agencies.213 Other
studies estimate indirect benefits, such as job creation and tax revenues likely to
come from increased federal funding.214 For example, in Virginia, state officials
estimated that the state would face increased spending of $137 million over ten
years to expand Medicaid.215 But when additional tax revenue resulting from
expansion was factored in, the estimate shifted to $555 million in savings.216 To
date, Virginia has not decided whether to expand Medicaid, and the decision
will likely wait until after the November 2013 gubernatorial election.217
Governors supportive of Medicaid expansion seemed to take the economic
arguments as a given, instead focusing on policy reasons. In the New England
Journal of Medicine article, among the eighteen governors surveyed supporting
Medicaid expansion, the number one reason given was that it will help cover the
uninsured.218 The second reason was that it would bolster their states’ prior health

209 See Goodnough & Pear, supra note 205.
210 Id. (quoting Ari Lipman, chairman of Northeast Ohio Medicaid Expansion Coalition).
211 Id.
212 See, e.g., Price & Eibner, supra note 5, at 1030 (using microsimulation to demonstrate the
effect of Medicaid opt–out on coverage and state spending).
213 See Luhby, supra note 179 (describing different studies in various states).
214 Id.; see also Custer, supra note 174, at 4 (estimating additional jobs and tax revenue resulting
from Medicaid expansion in Georgia); Rudowitz & Stephens, supra note 154, at 8 (“States that
implement the Medicaid expansion could also see savings or offsets and broader economic effects
that vary by state and cannot be modeled using national data.”).
215 Luhby, supra note 179 (citing study).
216 Id.
217 See Julian Walker, Va. Senators Named to Medicaid Review Panel, Virginian–Pilot (Norfolk, Va.) (Apr. 11, 2013, 8:07 PM), http://hamptonroads.com/2013/04/va–senators–named–medicaid–review–panel (noting that the Democratic gubernatorial candidate Terry McAuliffe supports
expansion, while Republican candidate Ken Cuccinelli opposes it).
218 Sommers & Epstein, supra note 154, at 498 tbl.2.
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care reform efforts.219 These supportive governors emphasized that Medicaid
expansion would actually save their states money by replacing state dollars with
federal dollars.220 Opt–in states, in many cases, are already providing some form
of assistance to low–income adults who previously did not qualify for Medicaid,
either as optional Medicaid groups or as separate state programs.221 Similar
voluntary expansion may not exist in many Red States.222 The governors’ reasons
for supporting Medicaid expansion suggest an established policy preference for
government involvement in social welfare and health care.
Even some initially reluctant states have come around to accept Medicaid
expansion due to political pressure. Health care providers, particularly hospitals,
have been vocal in their support for expansion.223 This, in part, is because of a deal
struck in the ACA. Well before the ACA, hospitals that treat a disproportionate
share of uninsured or underinsured patients were eligible for additional federal
disproportionate share hospital (DSH) funding.224 The ACA significantly cut
DSH funding,225 with the expectation that as more individuals became insured
through employer incentives, health insurance exchanges, and Medicaid
expansion, providers would see a lower portion of uninsured patients.226 But
in Medicaid opt–out states, a large segment of the group whom Congress
expected to be newly covered would remain uninsured. Providers in those states
would face the double burden of reduced DSH payments along with the same
rates of uninsured patients. Despite the clear logic of this argument, lawmakers
in many Red States remain unpersuaded.227
219 Id.
220 Id.
221 See Martha Heberlein et al., Kaiser Comm’n for Medicaid and the Uninsured,
The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Getting into Gear for 2014: Findings from a 50–
State Survey of Eligibility, Enrollment, Renewal, and Cost–Sharing Policies in
Medicaid and CHIP, 2012–2013 1, 33 tbl.4 ( Jan. 23, January 2013), http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.
files.wordpress.com/2013/05/8401.pdf (displaying income eligibility levels for some states’ optional
coverage for low–income non–disabled, nonelderly adults).
222 See id. (reporting that Georgia, for example, provides Medicaid coverage only to parents of
dependent children, and only up to 27% or 48% FPL depending on employment status).
223 See CBO, July 2012, supra note 55, at 9 (“Pressure to expand Medicaid coverage is . . . likely
to come from health care providers that stand to gain when more people have coverage. . . . [H]
ospitals that will receive smaller disproportionate share payments from Medicaid under the ACA
may exert pressure on states to make up for those losses by expanding Medicaid eligibility.”).
224 See generally Medicaid Program; State Disproportionate Share Hospital Allotment Reductions, 78 Fed. Reg. 28,551, 28,553 (proposed May 15, 2013) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 447)
(providing legislative history and overview of DSH allotments).
225 PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111–148, § 2551, 124 Stat. 119, 312–13 (2010) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1396r–4(f ) (2012)) (reducing payments to DSH payments).
226 See Goodnough & Pear, supra note 205 (“The change of heart for some Republican governors has come after vigorous lobbying by health industry players, particularly hospitals. Hospital
associations around the country signed off on Medicaid [DSH] cuts . . . on the assumption that
their losses would be more than offset by new paying customers . . . .”).
227 See Blau, supra note 184 (quoting vice president of large Atlanta public hospital) (ex-
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Another constituent group that has urged states to accept federal funding
for Medicaid expansion are employers.228 Employers in opt–out states face two
possible financial burdens. First, they may feel pressure to offer insurance to
otherwise Medicaid–eligible employees. Second, they may have to shoulder
higher premiums for their currently insured employees as providers try to offset
uncompensated care costs. If federal dollars can be used to insure low–income
workers, states receive a double benefit—relieving their business community
of a potentially crippling expense and shouldering the federal budget, rather
than their own, with the cost. Other studies suggest that the infusion of federal
funding could boost state economies and create new jobs.229 A study in Kansas,
for example, concluded that full Medicaid expansion would bring in more than
$3 billion to the state’s economy and create 4000 new jobs by 2020.230 A study
in Georgia estimated that over the next decade 70,343 jobs would be created,
bringing $8.2 billion to statewide economic output and generating state and
local tax revenue on average $276.5 million annually.231
There are other arguments, not expressed in the New England Journal of
Medicine survey, but which could persuade lawmakers to expand Medicaid.
Some advocates of expansion would surely urge that it is simply the morally
right thing to do.232 The ACA brings the U.S. health care system closer to a

plaining that the expected 50% cut in DSH payments is a “double whammy” without the offset
of more insured patients from Medicaid expansion); Rudowitz & Stephens, supra note 154, at 8
fig.13 (citing John Holahan et al., The Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid and the Uninsured,
The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., The Cost of Not Expanding Medicaid 13 fig.11 ( July
17, 2013), available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/07/8457–the–cost–of–
not–expanding–medicaid4.pdf ) (noting double loss of expected Medicaid payments and DSH
cuts on non–expansion states); Pugh, supra note 174 (noting trade–offs between increased federal
funding for Medicaid expansion and savings for indigent care). See generally Sommers & Epstein,
supra note 154 (discussing states’ continued resistance to expansion).
228 See Pugh, supra note 174 (quoting Joan Alker, co–executive director of the Center of Children and Families at Georgetown University) (“There are no big interests that are against this. The
hospitals are for it. The managed care industry is for it. Most of the employer groups are for it.”).
See, for example, Custer, supra note 174, at 5 tbl.2, for a list of the top ten industries in Georgia that
would be impacted by Medicaid expansion, including not only health care providers but real estate
establishments, food services and drinking places, employment services, wholesale trade businesses,
and services to buildings and dwellings.
229 See Rudowitz & Stephens, supra note 154, at 8 fig.14 (citing John Holahan et al., The
Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid and the Uninsured,The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., The
Cost of Not Expanding Medicaid 16–17 ( July 17, 2013), available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/07/8457–the–cost–of–not–expanding–medicaid4.pdf )
(noting,
among other fiscal implications for expansion states, increased jobs and tax revenues); Pugh, supra
note 174 (citing studies).
230 Chris Brown et al., Kan. Hosp. Ass’n, Economic and Employment Effects of Expanding KanCare in Kansas 8–9 (Feb. 2013), http://media.khi.org/news/documents/2013/02/18/
KanCare_Expansion_Report.pdf.
231 Custer, supra note 174, at 4 (summarizing findings).
232 See Pugh, supra note 174 (quoting Charles Blahous, a senior research fellow at the Mercatus Center, a market–oriented research center at George Mason University) (“‘From a social
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vision of health care as a right of all persons, not a privilege of those with
means to pay for it.233 Under this view, expansion of Medicaid to a new group of
“deserving poor,” specifically low–income childless adults, is a step in the right
direction. If state lawmakers could philosophically agree with that position, it
would be easier to sell them on various aspects of the ACA, including Medicaid
expansion.
The morality argument has some traction among certain constituents,
which view might be marshaled to encourage Red State lawmakers to opt
in. A form of that argument has been adopted and urged by some religious
organizations, including Catholic bishops, who have come out in support of
Medicaid expansion.234 Also, a recent poll of voters in the Deep South showed
strong support among both African–Americans and non–Hispanic whites.235
The most popular reason cited by survey respondents, approximately 57%, for
supporting Medicaid expansion is that the program operates as a safety net to
protect low–income people.236 This argument is consistent with the morality
view that the government has an obligation to provide for vulnerable members
of society. If those voicing the morality argument represent a significant voter
demographic, these arguments may become more persuasive.
Another economic argument in favor of expansion is that increasing the
rates of insured individuals in the population will improve overall health, and
thereby, lower health care costs.237 In many Southern states, the safety net for
or humanitarian perspective, you could argue Medicaid expansion is a winner. But from a purely
financial perspective, it’s clearly a loser.’ . . .”).
233 See Robert Pear, Sebelius Defends Law and Zeal in Push to Insure Millions, N.Y. Times
( July 8, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/09/us/politics/sebelius–defends–law–and–zeal–
in–push–to–insure–millions.html (“[Secretary Sebelius’s] job is . . . to nudge the nation toward a
new era in which health care is a right, not a privilege — all this over the opposition of Republicans
in Congress and in many state capitols, who are poised to pounce on any misstep.”).
234 See, e.g., Newkirk & Niquette, supra note 206 (noting that Bishop Bransfield of the Diocese of Wheeling– Charleston wrote to West Virginia Governor Tomblin, on behalf of the diocese’s 83,000 Catholics, urging him to expand Medicaid, stating that “Catholic social teaching supports adequate and affordable health care for all”); Goodnough & Pear, supra note 205 (noting that
a moral dimension was added to the campaign because of support from religious leaders such as
the Roman Catholic bishops in Salt Lake City and Little Rock who have urged their state officials
to expand Medicaid).
235 David A. Bositis, The Deep South and Medicaid Expansion: The View from Alabama, Georgia,
Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina, Joint Ctr. for Pol. & Econ. Stud. 1, 5 (May 2013),
http://jointcenter.org/sites/default/files/upload/research/files/The%20Deep%20South%20and%20
Medicaid%20Expansion.pdf.
236 Id. at 20. Other reasons why at least a plurality of respondents considered Medicaid important included the fact that the respondent knew someone who received Medicaid coverage in
the past, may need to rely on Medicaid in the future, and the program covers nursing home and
long–term care. Id. at 14–19.
237 See Rudowitz & Stephens, supra note 154, at 3 (citing the Institute of Medicine’s “authoritative report” demonstrating that “health insurance coverage is associated with better health
outcomes”). But see Katherine Baicker et al., The Oregon Experiment – Effects of Medicaid on Clinical
Outcomes, 368 New Eng. J. Med. 1713, 1713 (2013) (“Medicaid coverage generated no significant
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low–income, uninsured residents, absent Medicaid expansion, is the public
hospital system. But hospital care and emergency rooms do a particularly
poor job of primary care and prevention.238 In terms of improving health and
lowering health care costs, the Medicaid program is actually ahead of the curve
in prioritizing preventive care for children. Historically, Medicaid policy reflects
a strategy to improve health as well as to contain costs.239 The ACA now takes
that idea to other groups of insureds, requiring full coverage for preventive
care under commercial health insurance plans.240 Opt–out states’ failure to cover
preventative and primary care for low–income residents could have adverse
effects on individual and public health outcomes. State–specific estimates of the
economic of Medicaid expansion should consider such negative consequences.
C. Case Studies
To date, ten Republican–controlled states have indicated support for
expanding Medicaid. The current roster includes: Arizona, Arkansas, Florida,
Michigan, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio,241 and

improvements in measured physical health outcomes in the first 2 years, but it did increase use of
health care services, raise rates of diabetes detection and management, lower rates of depression,
and reduce financial strain.”).
238 See Pugh, supra note 174 (citing Emory professor Kenneth Thorpe’s observation that the
Southern states’ approach to uninsured patients has been investment in large public hospitals,
which do a poor job of primary care and prevention).
239 See Sara E. Wilensky & Elizabeth A. Gray, Existing Medicaid Beneficiaries Left Off the
Affordable Care Act’s Prevention Bandwagon, 32 Health Aff. 1188, 1188 (2013) (observing that newly eligible Medicaid beneficiaries may receive coverage for preventive care even in states where
existing Medicaid beneficiaries do not); Laura Snyder, Coverage of Preventive Services
for Adults in Medicaid, Kaiser Comm’n for Medicaid and the uninsured, The Henry
J. Kaiser Family Found. (Sept. 2012), available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.
com/2013/01/8359.pdf; Matthew F. Savage et al., Early Preventive Dental Visits: Effects on Subsequent
Utilization and Costs, 114 Pediatrics e418, e423 (2004), http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/114/4/e418.full.pdf (“Preschool–aged children who used early preventive dental care incurred
fewer dentally related costs, compared with children who began care at a later time.”); Sean Jessee,
Comment, Fulfilling the Promise of the Medicaid Act: Why the Equal Access Clause Creates Privately
Enforceable Rights, 58 Emory L.J. 791, 827 (2009) (arguing that preventive care decreases long–term
costs of indigent care).
240 See Preventive Services Covered Under the Affordable Care Act, See U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., http://www.hhs.gov/healthcare/facts/factsheets/2010/07/preventive–services–list.
html#CoveredPreventiveServicesforAdults (last visited Jan. 8, 2013); Comm. on Preventative Servs.
For Women, Clinical Preventative Services for Women: Closing the Gap 16–18 (2011) (discussing studies demonstrating economic benefits of preventive services and noting that “[t]he ACA
intends to mitigate these issues”); Timothy S. Jost, Implementing Health Reform: Preventive Services,
Health Aff. Blog ( July 15, 2010, 11:48 AM), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2010/07/15/implementing–health–reform–preventive–services (stating that one of four planned benefits from the preventive coverage rule is “[s]ome savings due to lower health care costs”).
241 See Advisory Bd. Daily Briefing, supra note 4 (summarizing states’ positions as of July
2013 on Medicaid expansion).
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Pennsylvania.242 Despite support from governors, Medicaid expansion remains
not fully enacted in at least some of these Red States. This article draws from
case studies of the dynamics surrounding Medicaid expansion in Arizona,
Arkansas, Michigan, and Florida in order to articulate the Red State Narrative.
In the first two states, both the governors and legislatures approved expansion.
In the latter two, the governors’ support for expansion could not gain legislative
approval before the 2013 sessions ended.
1. Arizona.—Arizona’s Republican governor, Jan Brewer, faced a political
dilemma in deciding whether to support or oppose Medicaid expansion in
her state. Her conservative base staunchly opposed the Affordable Care Act.
Any expression of support for implementing President Obama’s signature
domestic legislation risked alienating them.243 Her state constituency, however,
was heavily Latino, a demographic that largely supports Medicaid expansion
and which would be a substantial portion of the newly eligible population.244
Similarly, Republican governors of three Southwestern states, Arizona, Nevada,
and New Mexico, ultimately backed the option to accept the federal funding
for Medicaid expansion.245
Arizona’s Governor Brewer is something of a Tea Party darling, a highly
vocal critic of the Affordable Care Act, and strong supporter of her state’s
strict immigration legislation, which allows police to stop and question people
suspected of being in the country illegally.246 But under pressure from the newly
politically powerful Latino constituency, Brewer announced an about–face on
Medicaid expansion.247 She struck chords of “compassionate conservatism”248
and noted that expansion would be a cost–effective way of insuring the working

242 See Daniel Kelley, Pennsylvania Proposes Alternative to Expansion of Medicaid, NBCNews.
com (Sept. 17, 2013), http://www.nbcnews.com/health/pennsylvania–proposes–alternative–expansion–medicaid–4B11181090 (discussing Republican Governor Tom Corbett’s proposal).
243 See Santos, supra note 196.
244 Id. (citing a National Council of La Raza report indicating that 3.1 million additional
Latinos would be covered under full national expansion of Medicaid, accounting for about half of
the newly insured Latino population).
245 See id.
246 David Schwartz, Arizona Governor Jan Brewer Signs Medicaid Expansion, Reuters
( June 17, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/17/us–usa–arizona–medicaid–idUSBRE95G12N20130617. In a controversial decision, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld that portion
of the Arizona immigration law. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2510 (2012) (holding
that it was improper to enjoin this provision of Arizona state law because state courts had been
afforded no opportunity to construe it and there was no evidence its enforcement would conflict
with federal immigration law).
247 See Santos, supra note 196.
248 See id. (quoting Barrett Marson, a public relations consultant on his understanding of
Governor Brewer’s decision) (“‘[Ms. Brewer’s decision was, in part] about saying, ‘I want to show
American who I really am’ and that person is a compassionate conservative who thinks there should
be a safety net for people in the bottom rung.”).
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poor,249 many of whom would include the Latino immigrant population. Her
position implicitly recognized that her immigration position may no longer
be politically tenable in that region of the country.250 To carry her support for
Medicaid, Governor Brewer rallied business and health care groups, which also
strongly supported expansion.251 In June 2013, both houses of the Republican–
controlled legislature passed expansion legislation by comfortable margins.252
Medicaid expansion in Arizona is predicted to add approximately 300,000 new
enrollees and bring $1.6 billion in federal dollars to the state.253
The other Southwestern states with Republican governors faced similar
constituent pressure.254 Nevada’s Republican governor, Brian Sandoval, on
December 11, 2012, announced that the state would participate in Medicaid
expansion.255 He noted that he “never liked the Affordable Care Act because
of the individual mandate it places on citizens” but acknowledged the Court’s
decision to uphold it.256 Accordingly, he felt “forced to accept it as today’s
reality.”257 The Republican leadership in the state legislature immediately
supported the governor’s position.258 Medicaid expansion is expected to enroll
78,000 Nevadans and bring $700 million in federal funding over the first three
years.259
New Mexico’s Republican governor, Susana Martinez, also announced
support for Medicaid expansion in January 2013, noting that the decision
could potentially expand coverage to nearly 170,000 low–income, uninsured
residents.260 Giving a nod to the morality argument, Governor Martinez cited
an “obligation to provide an adequate level of basic healthcare services for
those most in need in our state.”261 New Mexico’s expansion includes a “circuit

249 Kathleen Doheny, Arizona OK’s Medicaid Expansion; Move Will Extend Health Care to
300,000 Residents Under Affordable, WebMD ( June 18, 2013), http://www.webmd.com/health–insurance/news/20130614/arizona–oks–medicaid–expansion.
250 See Santos, supra note 196.
251 Schwartz, supra note 246.
252 Id.
253 Id.
254 See Santos, supra note 196 (“Republican governors bucked the party line in the Southwest,
where Latinos are at once a significant slice of the poor population and a powerful voting bloc.”).
255 Anjeanette Damon, Sandoval Opts to Expand Medicaid Coverage for Nevada’s Neediest, Las
Vegas Sun (Dec. 11, 2012), http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2012/dec/11/sandoval–supports–
medicaid–expansion–nevada/.
256 Id.
257 Id.
258 Santos, supra note 196.
259 Id.
260 See Dennis Domrzalski, New Mexico to Join Medicaid Expansion Program, Albuquerque
Bus. First ( Jan. 9, 2013), http://www.bizjournals.com/albuquerque/news/2013/01/09/new–mexico–to–join–medicaid–expansion.html.
261 Id.
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breaker,” making the law contingent on the federal government’s maintaining
the ACA’s promised level of funding.262
The challenge with drawing lessons for the Red State Narrative from the
experiences of Arizona and other Southwestern states is that the political
forces at work there may be uniquely regional. Accepting the strong economic
arguments in favor of expansion, the “plus” factor in those states seemed to be
the growing political strength of the Latino population. That factor may not
hold the same sway in the entrenched Southern Red States. Recent polling,
however, suggests strong support among African–Americans, 85.3%, in five
Southern states.263 That constituency might be marshaled in similar fashion to
encourage expansion.264
So far, however, public opinions have not been sufficient to overcome
the overwhelming political rhetoric of states’ rights and deep opposition to
expansion of the federal government’s role in health care. The poll of Southern
states further tried to gauge the strength of arguments in favor of Medicaid
expansion. The most convincing argument was the suggestion that expansion
could create new jobs, stimulate economic activity, and generate new tax
revenue in the state. According to the survey, one–third of those polled who
initially opposed Medicaid expansion said this information would make them
more likely to support it.265 A majority of African–Americans who had opposed
expansion liked this argument, while the number was smaller for whites.266
Not surprisingly, this argument plays to the Red State preference for private
markets and promotion of commerce, more than to morality or social welfare
policy arguments.
Opponents of Medicaid expansion were also somewhat persuaded by the
fact that for every one dollar the state spent, the federal government would
spend nine dollars.267 That argument is simply a truism of the funding approach
under the ACA, but perhaps resonates with those concerned about the federal
government unfairly burdening states. Opponents were less persuaded by the
suggestions that many low–income people would remain uninsured if expansion
were not approved, that opting–out states would be effectively subsidizing
opting–in states, and that states could withdraw from Medicaid expansion after
the first three years of full federal support ended.268
In sum, the lesson from Arizona is that the morality argument regarding
262 See id.
263 Bositis, supra note 235, at 5 (survey conducted in Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi,
and South Carolina).
264 A majority of non–Hispanic whites in the South also support Medicaid expansion. Id.
(reporting 53.3% support expansion).
265 Id. at 12–13 tbl.2.
266 See id. at 13 tbl.2.
267 Id. at 11–12 tbl.2 (noting that 27% of respondents indicated that this argument would make
them somewhat more likely to support expansion).
268 Id. at 10–11.
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helping the uninsured and providing some basic entitlement or “right” to
health care, which typically is unpersuasive to Red State governors, can become
persuasive when the population expected to benefit from the policy represents a
significant voter constituency. A substantial portion of the Medicaid expansion
population in Southwestern states like Arizona are Latinos, an increasingly
powerful political group. Thus, economic arguments, plus voter demographics,
are key elements of the Red State Narrative.
2. Arkansas.—Arkansas’s private insurance market approach to Medicaid
expansion has been touted as a “game changer,”269 a demonstration of maximum
flexibility for states hesitant to expand Medicaid and reluctant to expand
government welfare programs. Arkansas is among the Red States with a
partisan split in the statehouse; Governor Mike Beebe is a Democrat, while the
legislature is staunchly Republican.270 The plan, approved by HHS Secretary
Kathleen Sebelius and enacted by the Arkansas legislature,271 authorizes the
state to enroll the Medicaid expansion population in private insurance plans.
Specifically, the new Medicaid population will be allowed to pick among plans
available on the newly created state health insurance exchanges, the same plans
in which small employers and other individuals will be enrolling, once those
exchanges open.272 In effect, Arkansas will use the federal matching dollars
offered to opting–in states to pay for new Medicaid enrollees’ premiums for
private health plans. Currently, Arkansas does not cover non–disabled, childless
adults at all and covers parents of eligible children only up to 17% FPL.273
Medicaid expansion could add as many as 250,000 new individuals to the rolls
in that state.274
The private plan approach to Medicaid expansion sounds radical and
certainly attracted the attention of commentators and other holdout states.275
But in fact, this “premium support” option has been available since Medicaid’s

269 See Rosenbaum & Sommers, The Great New Experiment, supra note 15, at 8.
270 Julie Rovner, Arkansas Medicaid Expansion Attracts Other States’ Interest, NPR (Mar. 26,
2013), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2013/03/26/175301509/arkansas–medicaid–expansion–attracts–other–states–interest.
271 See S.B. 1020, 89th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2013) (enacted as 2013 Ark. Acts at 1497),
available at http://www.arkleg.state.ar.us/assembly/2013/2013R/Acts/Act1497.pdf.
272 Rovner, supra note 270.
273 Id.
274 Id.
275 See id. (citations and internal citation marks omitted) (“[F]inding a way to do the expansion through private insurance coverage will open a door to a conversation that was not otherwise
taking place.”); Kelley, supra note 242 (“[M]odeled on similar proposals in Iowa and Arkansas,
where Republican officials have also resisted efforts to expand Medicaid eligibility under Obama’s
Affordable Care Act . . . .”); Rosenbaum & Sommers, The Great New Experiment, supra note 15, at 7
(noting that other states, including Ohio, are exploring similar arrangements).
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inception in 1965276 and employed to varying degrees by states over the years.277
More typically, these arrangements allow states to pay premiums toward
employer–sponsored health plans for Medicaid–eligible workers who are
offered that type of coverage.278 CHIP also provides a couple of options for
premium assistance for families and children.279 A less utilized option allows
states to pay premiums for individual non–group health insurance plans as
well.280 Collectively, these premium support programs represent a very small
portion, 1%, of all Medicaid and CHIP spending.281
What is radical about the Arkansas plan is that it tosses Medicaid
beneficiaries into a newly created, untested marketplace.282 And what is
politically tantalizing about it is the opportunity for states to expand coverage
to low–income, uninsured adults, thus placing the bulk of the funding onus
on the federal government, while appearing not to concede their Red State,
Obamacare–opposing bona fides. In the words of John Selig, director of the
Arkansas Department of Human Services, “There’s a feeling around here that
if the private market can do something . . . we ought to let them and not create
a larger government program.”283 The private insurance approach to Medicaid
expansion similarly could make it more palatable to Republicans in other
states.284
276 Social Security Act § 1905(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a) (2012); Margot Sanger–Katz, The Obama
Administration’s Super–Expensive, Legally Dubious Medicaid Plan, Nat’l J. (Mar. 6, 2013), http://
www.nationaljournal.com/daily/the–obama–administration–s–super–expensive–legally–dubious–
medicaid–plan–20130305 (“[HHS] had to reach back some 25 years into Medicaid law to find
the obscure provision that may permit such a move.”); Rosenbaum & Sommers, The Great New
Experiment, supra note 15 (“Since 1965, Medicaid has authorized the secretary of health and human
services to use federal funds to pay insurance premiums in states that elect such an approach.”);
Rovner, supra note 270 (“The authority to use Medicaid funds to buy insurance has been in the
[Medicaid] law since it was first enacted.”).
277 See generally Joan Alker, Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid & the Uninsured, The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found. Premium Assistance in Medicaid and CHIP: An Overview of
Current Options and Implications of the Affordable Care Act 1 (Mar. 18, 2013), available
at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/03/8422.pdf (describing various states’
use of “premium support” options).
278 See id. at 4 (describing Medicaid Section 1906 Health Insurance Premium Payment
(HIPP) programs).
279 See id. (describing CHIPRA Family Coverage Option and Premium Assistance Option).
280 See id. Alker also noted that the 2009 GAO Report identified only six states reporting a
Medicaid 1905(a) Premium Payment Option program, compared to twenty–nine states with 1906
programs. Id. at 6.
281 Id.
282 Rosenbaum & Sommers, The Great New Experiment, supra note 15, at 8.
283 Sandhya Somashekhar, Arkansas Plan Shows that Health Care Law’s Medicaid Expansion
Leaves Flexibility for States, Wash. Post (Mar. 9, 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013–
03–09/national/37578275_1_medicaid–expansion–insurance–oversight–health–law.
284 Using Medicaid Dollars for Private Insurance, Op.–Ed., N.Y Times (Mar. 31, 2012), http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/04/01/opinion/using–medicaid–dollars–for–private–insurance.html
[hereinafter Using Medicaid Dollars]; Rosenbaum & Sommers, The Great New Experiment, supra

2013– 2014 ]

the red state option

421

Despite approval by HHS and passage by the Arkansas legislature,
significant questions remain about the viability of the premium support plan.
First, the Arkansas approach to coverage may be substantially more expensive
for the federal government than traditional Medicaid. The Medicaid program’s
characteristic, open–ended, non–block–grant funding approach places no
cap on the amount of federal dollars available to states to cover Medicaid–
eligible beneficiaries.285 That approach encourages states to spend generously on
Medicaid and enroll as many eligible beneficiaries as possible.
Under the Arkansas approach, the federal government may face a much
steeper price to cover the Medicaid expansion population. The Congressional
Budget Office (“CBO”) estimates that it would cost 50% more, or $9000, to
buy a private health insurance plan on the exchanges, compared with $6000
to add an individual to traditional Medicaid.286 The higher cost of private
insurance coverage was precisely why Congress rejected that alternative in the
ACA itself.287
Moreover, it is not clear how the Arkansas arrangement will meet
the Medicaid comparability requirement. HHS recently issued proposed
regulations, that would require “[t]he cost of purchasing such coverage,
including administrative expenditures and the costs of providing wraparound
benefits for items and services covered under the Medicaid State plan, but
not covered under the individual health plan” to be “comparable to the cost of
providing direct coverage under the State plan.”288 The “comparability” term,
note 15, at 9 (“Ultimately, the most important aspect of premium assistance may be its appeal to
conservative politicians who are skeptical of the ACA generally and the Medicaid expansion in
particular . . . .”); Somashekhar, supra note 283 (“Conservative states might find buying coverage
from private insurers more palatable than expanding a government program. Even Democratic–led
states might prefer this arrangement because it eliminates some bureaucratic hurdles.”); see Baker,
supra note 14 (noting that Iowa has proposed a similar waiver); Johnson, supra note 14 (“The Obama
administration’s approval . . . of Arkansas’ plan to expand health coverage for low–income residents
under the federal healthcare reform law bodes well for several Republican–led states looking to
implement their own alternative models for expanding Medicaid.”).
285 See supra notes 69, 134–38 and accompanying text (describing Medicaid funding structure
and incentives for state spending).
286 Somashekhar, supra note 283; see also Using Medicaid Dollars, supra note 284 (“[P]rivate
insurance is almost always more costly than Medicaid.”); Rosenbaum & Sommers, The Great New
Experiment, supra note 15, at 9 (citing the same CBO numbers and discussing policymakers’ concerns that the premium support model of Medicaid expansion is not financially sustainable).
287 See supra sources cited note 23; Sanger–Katz, supra note 276 (discussing Senate Finance
Committee proposal to rely on exchanges, rather than Medicaid expansion, for low–income uninsureds).
288 Proposed Rule Regarding Medicaid Premiums and Cost Sharing, 78 Fed. Reg. 4594,
4624–25, 4696 (proposed Jan. 22, 2013) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 435.1015(a)(4)), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR–2013–01–22/pdf/2013–00659.pdf; Alker, supra note 277, at 5
(describing cost effectiveness standard, expressed as “comparable coverage” but term not defined);
Sara Rosenbaum, Using Medicaid Funds to Buy Qualified Health Plan Coverage for Medicaid Beneficiaries, Health Reform GPS (Mar. 7, 2013), http://www.healthreformgps.org/resources/using–
medicaid–funds–to–buy–qualified–health–plan–coverage–for–medicaid–beneficiaries/ [hereinaf-
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however, is not defined, and no range between Medicaid and the private plan
is provided.289 Even if that term receives clearer definition, it will be hard to
know whether the exchanges can offer comparably priced plans until they are
up and running.
Another question is how Arkansas will ensure that privately insured
Medicaid enrollees receive the full range of services and benefits, and for
the same cost–sharing obligations, as traditional Medicaid beneficiaries.290
HHS is clear that the private insurance option is available only if the state
covers the expansion population to the same extent as traditional Medicaid
beneficiaries.291 If private plans sold on the exchanges are less comprehensive,
the state will have to make up the difference through wraparound coverage.292
This issue is especially concerning for any children whom the state seeks to
cover through the exchanges because Medicaid’s EPSDT package of benefits
may be substantially more comprehensive than private plans.293 Also, if the
private plans require enrollees to pay higher deductibles and copayments than
traditional Medicaid, the state will have to equalize that difference.294 The
logistics of complying with these requirements have yet to be worked out.295
Aside from the face–saving political rhetoric, there are other potentially
beneficial aspects of the premium support approach to Medicaid expansion.
First, the exchanges are intended to create viable markets for individual health
insurance that previously did not exist.296 If the exchanges function as intended,
they could generate comparably priced plans to traditional Medicaid coverage.
Moreover, to the extent that the Medicaid expansion population is comprised of
relatively healthy individuals, a plausible expectation, considering that the group
largely includes the working poor, the addition of those new insureds to the
exchange risk pools could improve the functioning of the new marketplaces.297

ter Rosenbaum, Health Reform GPS].
289 Rosenbaum, Health Reform GPS, supra note 288.
290 See Using Medicaid Dollars, supra note 284 (“There is . . . a risk that poor people will end
up with fewer benefits and higher cost–sharing on the exchanges despite regulations that should
prohibit that.”).
291 78 Fed. Reg. at 4624 (defining “cost–effective” as the cost of Medicaid–eligible individuals purchasing plans on the private market); 78 Fed. Reg. at 4696 (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. §
435.1015(a)(2)–(3)).
292 See Alker, supra note 277, at 8 (“[S]tate would need to provide wraparound coverage to
ensure individuals maintain full Medicaid benefits and cost sharing protections.”); FAQ, Dec. 10,
2012, supra note 153, at 18 (“[P]remium assistance options are subject to the federal standards related
to wrap around benefits, cost sharing and cost effectiveness.”).
293 See Alker, supra note 277, at 8–9.
294 See id. at 8; see also Rosenbaum & Sommers, The Great New Experiment, supra note 15, at 9.
295 See Rosenbaum, Health Reform GPS, supra note 288.
296 See Rovner, supra note 270 (“[N]ew Medicaid enrollees will be relatively healthy, relatively
young people with relatively low insurance costs . . . [which] could bring premiums down in the
exchanges . . . .”).
297 See id.; Premium Assistance FAQs, supra note 166, at 2 (suggesting that states may be able
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Second, the arrangement could reduce “churn”298 and support continuity
of coverage, especially at the highest end of the Medicaid income eligibility
group.299 Individuals just at or below 138% FPL may experience fluctuations
in income levels, for various reasons, including variable work hours. Thus, an
individual may be eligible for Medicaid in one month, but ineligible and facing
the prospect of purchasing a private plan in another month, when his income
is higher.300 Switching between Medicaid and private plans month–to–month
may mean entirely different rosters of providers and covered services, thus
creating significant continuity of care problems. If these individuals instead
stay in the same exchange–based private insurance plan—with the only
difference being whether the government, via Medicaid, or the individual, via
self or employer, pays the premium in any given month—these problems can
be reduced or avoided.301
Third, the private insurance approach to Medicaid expansion could
increase access to care.302 Medicaid is perennially challenged to enlist
sufficient participating providers due to low rates of reimbursement.303 Private
insurance plans typically reimburse providers at a higher rate and have better
participation.304 Accordingly, Medicaid enrollees covered through private plans
may have a larger network of providers from which to choose.305 Other states
and federal authorities will be watching Arkansas carefully to gauge the likely
success of the premium support approach to Medicaid expansion.306

to quantify cost effectiveness of a premium support option, for example, by showing “increased
competition in Marketplaces given the additional enrollees due to premium assistance”).
298 Rovner, supra note 270 (explaining that churning occurs when an individual’s income is
near the income threshold for Medicaid eligibility, meaning that in some months the individual
may qualify for Medicaid while in other months he may not and will be pushed back into the private insurance market); Rosenbaum & Sommers, The Great New Experiment, supra note 15, at 8 (citing Sommers & Epstein, supra note 154, at 469–99) (“[L]ow–income adults experience so much income fluctuation that 28 million annually could ‘churn’ across the Medicaid–exchange divide . . . .”)
299 Alker, supra note 277, at 8.
300 See Rosenbaum & Sommers, The Great New Experiment, supra note 15, at 8; FAQ, Dec. 10,
2012, supra note 153 at 17 (explaining how states can use premium assistance to promote continuity
of care when individuals move among coverage options).
301 Rosenbaum & Sommers, The Great New Experiment, supra note 15, at 8–9; Rovner, supra
note 270 (discussing reduced churning and improved continuity).
302 Rosenbaum & Sommers, The Great New Experiment, supra note 15, at 9.
303 See Rovner, supra note 270.
304 See id. (quoting Austin Frakt, health economist at Boston University) (“‘One of the basic
critiques of the Medicaid program is they pay providers too little and that’s why too few of them
participate’ . . . .”).
305 Using Medicaid Dollars, supra note 284; Alker, supra note 277, at 8.
306 For further examination of Arkansas’s strategy, see Sidney D. Watson, Medicaid,
Marketplaces, and Premium Assistance: What Is at Stake in Arkansas? The Perils and Pitfalls of Medicaid
Expansion Through Marketplace Premium Assistance, 102 Ky. L. J. 471 (2014).
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3. Michigan.—In Michigan, Governor Rick Snyder was the sixth Red State
governor to come out in support of Medicaid expansion.307 Governor Snyder, a
Republican, cited a host of reasons, including reducing the state’s uninsured rate
by 46%, bringing in substantial federal funding, increasing access to primary
care providers, reducing the burden on hospitals and small businesses, saving
tax dollars, and “put[ting] Michigan, rather than Washington, in the driver’s
seat in terms of [health reform] implementation.”308 At the end of the 2013
legislative session, the Michigan legislature was unable to agree on expansion.
Finally, in September 2013, Governor Snyder became the third Republican
governor of a state with a Republican–controlled legislature to sign Medicaid
expansion into law.309
Governor Snyder faced an uphill battle to gain the support of the state
legislature. He announced his support for Medicaid expansion as part of his
state budget proposal on February 6, 2013.310 He noted that Medicaid expansion
was estimated to reduce uncompensated care costs by $351 million over the
next decade, bring $20 billion in additional federal funds to the state by 2023,
and save the state $1.2 billion between 2013 and 2020.311
Snyder’s position on Medicaid expansion found support among medical
groups, such as the Michigan Health and Hospital Association, as well as
traditionally conservative commerce groups, such as the Small Business
Administration312 and the Michigan Chamber of Commerce.313 Both
constituencies noted that the ACA’s cuts in DSH funding for uncompensated
care would increase costs for medical providers and businesses paying health
307 See Advisory Bd. Daily Briefing, supra note 4 (summarizing states’ positions on Medicaid expansion).
308 Press Release, Governor Rick Snyder, Snyder Calls for Medicaid Expansion to Improve
Health, Save Money; Greater Access to Care, Lower Business Costs Among Benefits (Feb. 6, 2013), http://
www.michigan.gov/snyder/0,4668,7–277–57577_57657–294479––,00.html [hereinafter Snyder Press
Release].
309 See H.R. 4714, 97th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2013), available at http://www.legislature.
mi.gov/documents/2013–2014/publicact/pdf/2013–PA–0107.pdf; Jonathan Oosting, Michigan Gov.
Rick Snyder Signs Historic Medicaid Plan into Law: This Is About “Family” Not “Politics”, Mlive.
com (Sept. 16, 2013),) http://www.mlive.com/politics/index.ssf/2013/09/michigan_gov_rick_snyder_signs_6.html (describing the “Healthy Michigan” plan). The other two states are Arizona and
North Dakota. Gov. Snyder Signs Medicaid Expansion Bill, CBS Detroit (Sept. 16, 2013), http://
detroit.cbslocal.com/2013/09/16/gov–snyder–to–sign–medicaid–expansion–bill/.
310 See Mary Wisniewski, Michigan Republican Governor Snyder Backs Medicaid Expansion,
Reuters (Feb. 6, 2013, 4:41 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/06/us–usa–healthcare–
medicaid–idUSBRE91519720130206.
311 Snyder Press Release, supra note 308. The figure for savings from uncompensated care came
from a Kaiser Family Foundation study on the state–by–state effects of the Affordable Care Act.
Holahan et al., supra note 174, at 9.
312 Wisniewski, supra note 310.
313 Mark Brush, One More Republican Calls for Medicaid Expansion in Michigan, Mich. Radio
( July 8, 2013, 12:06 PM), http://www.michiganradio.org/post/one–more–republican–calls–medicaid–expansion–michigan.
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insurance premiums for their workers, due to increased cost shifting.314
Michigan’s House Speaker, however, immediately expressed uncertainty
about expanding Medicaid, arguing that “[t]he federal government has a
history of working with states to start long–term projects while providing only
short–term funding, and then sticking state taxpayers with the future financial
liability that program creates.”315 With this objection in mind, Governor Snyder
proposed that half of all savings from the Medicaid expansion should be placed
in a fund to offset the increased Medicaid costs after 2020, should the federal
government lower payments from the levels promised in the ACA.316
Although the legislature’s research confirmed the minimal budgetary
impact of Medicaid expansion, Governor’s Snyder’s budget was not approved as
proposed. The Senate’s Fiscal Agency concluded that “[e]ven in the worst case
scenario, the proposed expansion of Medicaid would result in large . . . savings
during the first five years, with net . . . costs . . . not exceeding savings until the
10th year of the expansion.”317 In March, a House subcommittee removed over
$180 million that the Department of Community Health would have received
if the state approved Medicaid expansion.318 The vote on Medicaid expansion
fell along party lines.319 Republicans in the legislature repeated fears that
“federal money could not be guaranteed.”320 The budget for the Department
of Community Health was eventually approved, but without the Medicaid
expansion, by a slim margin.321 This essentially ended the chance for Medicaid
expansion to be approved through the budget process. Governor Snyder signed
the budget on June 13, 2013, without a provision for Medicaid expansion.322
Meanwhile, House Republicans were working on a modified form of
314 Scott Davis, Clock Ticking on Michigan Medicaid Expansion, Lansing State J. July 7, 2013,
at A1.
315 Kathleen Gray & Robin Erb, On Medicaid Expansion, Michigan GOP Gov. Snyder Will
Need Legislature’s Support, Governing (Feb. 7, 2013), http://www.governing.com/news/state/mct–
snyder–announces–support–for–medicaid–expansion.html (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting House Speaker Jase Bolger).
316 See Snyder Press Release, supra note 308.
317 Steve Angelotti, Senate Fiscal Agency, Fiscal Analysis of Governor Snyder’s Medicaid
Expansion Proposal 14 (2013), available at http://www.senate.michigan.gov/sfa/Publications/Issues/
MedicaidExpansion/MedicaidExpansionProposal.pdf.
318 Kathleen Gray, House Subcommittee Passes Health Budget Without Gov. Snyder’s Proposed
Medicaid Expansion, Detroit Free Press (Mar. 20, 2013, 12:27 PM), http://www.freep.com/article/20130320/NEWS15/130320036/House–subcommitee–passes–health–budget–without–Gov–
Snyder–s–proposed–Medicad–expansion.
319 Id.
320 Id.
321 Kathleen Gray, Medicaid Expansion Takes Another Hit with Vote in State Senate, Detroit
Free Press (May 16, 2013, 5:57 PM), http://www.freep.com/article/20130516/NEWS06/305160161/
medicaid–affordable–care–act–sentate–low–income.
322 Paul Egan, Gov. Snyder Signs 2014 State Budget, Says It’s ‘Very Solid,’ Detroit Free Press
( June 14, 2013, 12:12 AM), http://www.freep.com/article/20130613/NEWS06/306130100/Gov–Snyder–signs–2014–state–budget–says–s–very–solid.
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Medicaid expansion. This bill would expand Medicaid for only four years, rather
than the full seven years for which the ACA expressly provides funding.323 More
significantly, the bill would require new Medicaid beneficiaries with incomes
above the federal poverty level to contribute 5% of their annual income to
their health care. This copayment would be increased to 7% if a beneficiary
remained covered under Medicaid for longer than four years.324 The required
financial contribution injects a stronger element of individual responsibility and
cost sharing than traditional Medicaid imposes on beneficiaries. Because the
proposal departs significantly from statutory limits on Medicaid cost–sharing,
it would require federal approval.325
This alternate approach to Medicaid expansion passed the Michigan State
House, but stalled in the Senate during the regular session.326 The Senate
Majority Leader, Randy Richardville, refused to take the bill to a vote because
he was not confident that a super–majority of Republicans would support
it.327 Richardville insisted that his maneuver saved the governor from certain
political defeat. He rejected Governor Snyder’s criticism that the move was
a “vacation” instead of a “vote.”328 Instead, Richardville appointed a Senate
work group, consisting of six Republicans and two Democrats, to consider
alternatives during the legislative recess.329
The Senate narrowly passed a slightly modified version of the House bill
on August 27, 2013.330 The Senate amendments require the state to seek two
waivers from the federal government. One waiver establishes health savings
accounts for non–disabled adults with incomes between 100% and 133% of
the federal poverty level and requires such individuals to pay up to 5% of their
yearly income as co–pays.331 The second waiver would require the non–disabled
adults who are covered under state Medicaid for 48 months to either (1) accept
premium tax assistance credits to purchase insurance on the health insurance
323 See Karen Bouffard, Medicaid Expansion Heads to Senate, Detroit News, June 14, 2013, at
A12, available at 2013 WLNR 14612990.
324 Id.
325 Id.
326 Id.
327 See Chad Livengood, GOP Rebuffs Gov’s Agenda, Detroit News, June 22, 2013, at A5,
available at 2013 WLNR 15271667; see also Davis, supra note 314.
328 See Livengood, supra note 327.
329 See Kathleen Gray, Senate Majority Leader Appoints Two Democrats to Medicaid Expansion Group, Detroit Free Press ( Jul. 3, 2013, 10:56 AM), http://www.freep.com/article/20130702/
NEWS06/307020089/Senate–Majority–Leader–appoints–two–Democrats–to–Medicaid–expansion–work–group.
330 H.B. 4714, 97th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2013), available at http://www.legislature.mi.gov/
documents/2013–2014/publicact/pdf/2013–PA–0107.pdf; see also Kathleen Gray, Medicaid Expansion Passes After Heating Politicking; 470,000 More Michiganders to Get Coverage, Detroit Free
Press (Aug. 27, 2013, 11:37 PM), http://www.freep.com/article/20130827/NEWS06/308270106/
Medicaid–expansion–michigan–vote–affordable–care–act.
331 Social Welfare Act, H.B. 4714, 97th Leg. § 105d(1)(e) (2013).
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exchanges or (2) pay co–pays of up to 7% of their income.332 With great fanfare,
Governor Snyder signed the legislation into law on September 16, 2013,
declaring: “The right answer is not to talk about politics, but to talk about our
family of 10 million people.”333 The Medicaid expansion will not be effective
until the first waiver is passed,334 and it will be invalidated if both waivers are
not approved.335
Governor Snyder’s early, vocal support of Medicaid expansion cost him
support among many Tea Party supporters. They criticized the governor
for inviting Secretary Sebelius to Michigan to rally support for Medicaid
expansion, calling the Secretary “a representative of the most destructive
American President of our history as a nation.”336 Tea Party activists have also
pushed for the replacement of the lieutenant governor with “a conservative
option.”337 Many Michigan Republicans remained reluctant to support any
version of Medicaid expansion, fearing challenges from the Tea Party.338 One
of the Senate work group members proposed a radical, market–based approach
for the low–income uninsured that would replace Medicaid expansion with
catastrophic coverage purchased through the private exchange market,339
similar to the proposal under consideration in Florida.340
The situation in Michigan demonstrates the persistent sway of Tea Party
forces even in the face of clear financial benefit to the state. A coalition of
Democratic and Republican supporters is essential for Medicaid expansion,
but cannot coalesce as long as Republican lawmakers fear political retribution
and refuse to cross the Red State line. Governor Snyder advocated Medicaid
expansion, citing a host of accepted reasons and receiving backing from key
business and health care constituents. As he signed the law, he sounded clear
morality tones, dismissing political obstructionism. He spoke of “our family”
of uninsured residents.341 He added, “‘[F]or the sweet love of God, let’s
332 H.B. 4714 § 105d(20).
333 Oosting, supra note 309; see also Kathleen Gray et al., Snyder Signs Medicaid Expansion into
Law, Lansing State J. Sept. 17, 2013, at A3, available at 2013 WLNR 23191797.
334 H.B. 4714, 97th Leg. § 105d(1)(a) (2013) (“The department of community health shall not
begin enrollment of individuals eligible under this subdivision until January 1, 2014 or until the
waiver requested in this subsection is approved by the United States department of health and human services . . . .”); Oosting, supra note 309.
335 H.B. 4714 § 105d(26).
336 Kathleen Gray, Tea Party Group Threatens to Pull Support of Gov. Rick Snyder Over Proposed Medicaid Expansion, Detroit Free Press ( June 11, 2013, 7:16 PM), http://www.freep.com/
article/20130611/NEWS06/306110090/Medicaid–tea–party–governor–rick–snyder–re–election.
337 Tim Skubick, Tea Party May Push to Replace Lt. Gov. Brian Calley, But Expect a Fight,
Mlive.com ( Jul. 21, 2013, 8:48 AM), http://www.mlive.com/politics/index.ssf/2013/07/tim_skubick_tea_party_rick_sny.html.
338 Davis, supra note 314.
339 Id. (discussing Senator Bruce Caswell’s proposal).
340 See infra notes 360–83 (discussing Florida’s CARE plan).
341 Oosting, supra note 309.
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understand that we have to work together to make our government work,’ he
said to applause. ‘Politics is a sport to many Americans, but it should not be a
blood sport. We are all in this together.’”342 Whether Governor Snyder’s plea for
civility and morality will appeal to other Red States remains dubious.
4. Florida.—More surprising than Governor Snyder’s support for Medicaid
expansion was the support from Florida’s Republican governor, Rick Scott.343
In February 2013, Governor Scott became the seventh Red State governor to
announce that the state would expand Medicaid.344 Governor Scott had been
one of the ACA’s most vocal critics, and his state was the lead plaintiff in NFIB v.
Sebelius, seeking to block both the individual mandate and Medicaid expansion.
Florida also had declined to support ACA implementation by establishing
a state–based health insurance exchange, and, immediately following the
Supreme Court’s decision in June 2012, Governor Scott announced that the
state would opt out of Medicaid expansion as well.345
In explaining his about–face, Scott cited both the generous federal funding
and double taxation rationales. 346 Accordingly, he supported a three–year
expansion, limited to the time period during which the federal government
would fully fund the expansion population’s coverage. Conceding that there
were “no perfect options,” Scott summed up the situation: “[O]ur options are
either having Floridians pay to fund this program in other states while denying
health care to our citizens, . . . or using federal funding to help some of the
poorest in our state with the Medicaid program as we explore other health care
reforms.”347 He also noted that his mother’s recent death and her struggle to
raise five children on limited income influenced his decision.348
Governor Scott timed his announcement supporting Medicaid expansion
with another announcement regarding the state’s existing Medicaid program.349
The language of the press release was emblematic of the Red State Narrative,
suggesting that that state and federal authorities had struck some sort of deal
that could be chalked up as a victory for the state. Scott stressed that “after
months of negotiations with HHS,” Florida had “won” two waivers “granting
342 Id.
343 See Goodnough & Pear, supra note 205 (“Mr. Scott’s support for expanding Medicaid is
particularly significant . . . and surprising. . . . [H]e has been among the most strident critics of the
health care law, and his opposition to it was a cornerstone of his 2010 campaign for governor.”).
344 See Lizette Alvarez, In Reversal, Florida to Take Health Law’s Medicaid Expansion, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 20, 2013, at A13, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/21/us/in–reversal–florida–says–it–will–expand–medicaid–program.html.
345 See id.
346 See id.
347 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
348 Id.
349 See Jason Millman, Florida Gets OK for Medicaid Managed Care, Politico ( June 17,
2013, 5:06 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/06/florida–medicaid–managed–care–rick–
scott–92863.html.
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additional flexibilities” for the state’s Medicaid program.350 The first waiver
related to the long–term care program, and the second related to the Statewide
Medicaid Managed Care Program.351 Scott emphasized that the Secretary’s
approval “makes us two–for–two in our request for Medicaid flexibilities.”352
In reality, such waiver requests are common and easily granted to states under
well–established Medicaid amendments.353 The waivers also were not newly
devised by Governor Scott, but expanded Medicaid demonstration projects
initiated under prior Governor Jeb Bush.354 Scott’s announcement, however,
allowed him to frame his support for Medicaid expansion not as rolling over to
federal authorities but as part of a strategically negotiated deal.
Even with the governor’s support for expansion, the matter was still subject
to approval by Florida’s Republican–controlled legislature.355 Two Republican
House Representatives, Will Weatherford and Richard Corcoran, proposed
a dramatically different plan that would be entirely state–funded and free–
market–based.356 The sponsors listed seven reasons for rejecting Medicaid
expansion, many of which are familiar from the NEJM survey, including that
Medicaid is: (1) a failing program, (2) harms others (especially Medicare
recipients, a significant demographic in Florida given the retiree population)
by limiting access to providers, (3) ties up state resources for education and
other initiatives, (4) is characterized by unpredictable costs, (5) presents the
possibility of the federal government reneging on its generous funding promise,
(6) drives up charity care and private insurance costs through cost–shifting, and
(7) increases dependency on government services.357
The proposal would retain Florida’s existing, limited Medicaid expansion
for low–income parents; those with jobs are eligible for Medicaid up to 56%
FPL, and those without are eligible up to 22% FPL.358 Individuals with
incomes between 138% and 100% FPL would be eligible for federal subsidies
350 Press Release, Rick Scott, Governor Scott: Florida Wins 2nd Medicaid Waiver Granting
Flexibilities, Rick Scott (Feb. 20, 2013), http://www.flgov.com/2013/02/20/governor–scott–
florida–wins–2nd–medicaid–waiver–granting–flexibilities/.
351 Id.
352 Id.
353 See supra notes 107–14 (discussing Medicaid waiver and managed care options).
354 See Millman, supra note 349.
355 Goodnough & Pear, supra note 205 (noting that Republican leaders “expressed misgivings”).
356 Avik Roy, Florida’s Innovative, Consumer–Driven Replacement for Obamacare’s Medicaid Expansion, Forbes (Apr. 12, 2013, 10:45 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/theapothecary/2013/04/12/
floridas–innovative–consumer–driven–replacement–for–obamacares–medicaid–expansion/ [hereinafter Roy, April].
357 Fla. House Majority Office, Florida Health Choices Plus 3, 7–24 (2013), available
at http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Handlers/LeagisDocumentRetriever.ashx?Leaf=housecontent/
HouseMajorityOffice/Lists/Other%20Items/Attachments/6/Florida_Heath_Choices_Plus.
pdf&Area=House (discussing seven reasons in detail); see also Roy, April, supra note 356 (summarizing opponents’ arguments).
358 See Roy, April, supra note 356.
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on the new health insurance exchanges, as provided in the ACA.359 Other
low–income, uninsured individuals would be offered a “CARE” (Contribution
Amount for Reasonable Expenses) plan through the existing, pre–ACA Florida
Health Choices program.360 Florida Health Choices is essentially a private–
market clearinghouse offering a range of insurance products, ranging from
high–deductible catastrophic health plans to wraparound concierge medical
plans.361 Although operating somewhat similarly to the ACA’s health insurance
exchanges, Florida Health Choices is not subject to the exchange mandates
and offers plans that would not comply with the new federal requirements.362
Participants would receive $2000 per year from the Florida government and
would be required to contribute $25 per month of their own income.363 There
are also variable work requirements for participants, depending on worker age
and dependents, ranging from 20 to 35 hours per week, similar to old federal
welfare–to–work programs.364
The CARE plan effectively amounts to a $2300 annual voucher or health
savings account, which could be spent on plans in Florida Health Choices,
or to pay out–of–pocket medical expenses.365 The proposal is similar to John
McCain’s and Paul Ryan’s proposals for federal health reform.366 The amount
would roll over, meaning that participants would not lose the money if they did
not end up using it in any given year.367 Employers could also use the program
to make contributions for the benefit of their employees.368 Among other
advantages, the sponsors urge that the plan does not suffer from Medicaid’s
unpredictable costs, driven in large part by its characteristic defined benefit
plan.369 CARE, by contrast, is a defined contribution plan.370 Moreover, it is
359 Id.
360 Id.; Anthony Brino, Florida Democrats, Governor Balk at GOP Medicaid Alternative,
Healthcare Payer News (Mar. 16, 2013), http://www.healthcarepayernews.com/content/florida–
democrats–governor–balk–gop–medicaid–alternative.
361 Avik Roy, Florida Senate Republicans Vote to Expand Obamacare and Medicaid, Rejecting
House’s Free–Market Alternative, Forbes (May 1, 2013, 2:45 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
theapothecary/2013/05/01/florida–senate–republicans–vote–to–expand–obamacare–and–medicaid–rejecting–houses–free–market–alternative/ [hereinafter Roy, May].
362 See Roy, April, supra note 356.
363 Id.
364 Id.; see also Florida Health Choices Plus, supra note 357, at 37–38 (describing “[r]
easonable work requirements for recipients of taxpayer help”).
365 Roy, April, supra note 356.
366 Roy, May, supra note 361.
367 Roy, April, supra note 356.
368 Id. (noting that employers could also use the CARE system to make defined contributions
to their employees); see also Brino, supra note 360 (“Employers could also used [sic]use the account–
based system to make defined contributions to their workers—who, in retail and service industries
. . . face an uncertain future of health coverage as businesses figure out whether to ‘pay or play.’”).
369 See Roy, April, supra note 356.
370 Id.
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fully state controlled, allows consumers to actively direct their health care, and
relies on the free market rather than government assistance.371
The CARE plan, however, would cover substantially fewer of Florida’s
current 3.7 million uninsured individuals than Medicaid expansion.372
Medicaid expansion is predicted to cover roughly one million currently
uninsured Floridians,373 while the CARE plan would cover just 55% percent
of that population.374 Other estimates are even lower, suggesting that CARE
would cover only 115,000 people.375 Bill sponsors note, however, that Medicaid
expansion would ultimately cost the state $1.3 billion, while their plan would
cost a mere $237 million.376 The sponsors justified fractional coverage and
the private–market model by noting that only 28% of uninsured Floridians
are below the federal poverty level, most are in good health, most are only
temporarily uninsured, and only a small minority, 12%, used more than $2000
of health care in the previous year.377 Accordingly, CARE operates as a “bridge”
between gaps in insurance rather than fostering “permanent dependency.”378
The CARE plan passed the Florida House in April, but Senate Republicans
rejected it, opting instead to support Medicaid expansion modeled on the
Statewide Medicaid Managed Care waiver that Governor Scott had touted.379
Echoing the Governor’s statements, Senate sponsors played up the market–
based elements of Medicaid expansion, including the role of private insurers
and cost–sharing requirements.380 But again, the arrangement would not be
dramatically different than private insurance approaches to Medicaid coverage
long allowed under previous Medicaid amendments.381 Governor Scott offered
his support for the Senate’s “Healthy Florida” plan, again raising the double–
371 See id.
372 Brino, supra note 360 (“The plan . . . would cover about 115,000 uninsured Floridians—a
fraction of the state’s estimated 3.7 million uninsured and far fewer than the 186,000 who would be
covered under ACA–expanded eligibility.”).
373 Brino, supra note 360 (reporting that 816,000 are to be covered under Medicaid expansion); Sarah Kliff, Florida Rejects Medicaid Expansion, Leaves 1 Million Uninsured, Wash. Post
Wonkblog (May 5, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/05/05/florida–rejects–medicaid–expansion–leaves–1–3–million–uninsured/ (reporting that approximately 1.3
million Floridians were expected to gain coverage through Medicaid expansion); Roy, April, supra
note 356 (reporting that 900,000 Floridians would gain coverage through Medicaid expansion).
374 Roy, April, supra note 356.
375 Brino, supra note 360.
376 Roy, April, supra note 356.
377 Brino, supra note 360 (“Only 25 percent of Florida’s uninsured leave below the poverty line
. . . .”); Florida Health Choices Plus, supra note 357, at 26–30 (“Only 1 in 4 uninsured Floridians
live in poverty.”); Roy, April, supra note 356 (“It turns out that only 28 percent of uninsured Floridians live below the poverty line . . . .”).
378 Roy, April, supra note 356.
379 Roy, May, supra note 361.
380 Id.
381 See supra notes 107–26 and accompanying text (describing flexibility allowed under Medicaid program).
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taxation argument.382 The 2013 legislative session ended without resolution of
the Medicaid expansion issue or adoption of the House alternative approach.383
Despite the failure to enact Medicaid expansion legislation, the experience
in Florida is useful for developing the Red State Narrative. First, Governor
Scott’s support for expansion embodied the economics “plus” trend that has
brought other Red State governors along. The “plus” being some negotiated
victory for the state and insistence that a significant element of state autonomy
be retained. Whether a core market–based element to the expansion plan is
necessary for passage remains to be seen. Even with the governor’s negotiated
federalism frame and Senate leaders’ emphasis on the private, managed care
delivery model, expansion was still not yet politically palatable.
IV. The Red State Narrative
Drawing from the above case studies, five key elements of the Red State
Narrative can be identified: First, recognizing the changes that the ACA made
to the Medicaid program are not new or constitutionally significant; second,
acknowledging the nearly irrefutable economic analyses demonstrating the
net benefit to expansion states; third, identifying a politically compelling
constituency to push for expansion; fourth, heralding at least the appearance
of a significant concession from the federal government; and, fifth, retaining
elements of a private health insurance market within the expansion model.
The first element in framing the Red State Narrative is to emphasize, as
the first Parts of this Article did,384 that what is being asked of states by way
of the ACA’s Medicaid expansion is not dramatically different from prior
amendments to the Medicaid statute. If state lawmakers opposing expansion
can come to recognize this fact, they may be able to back off of some of the
entrenched Tea Party rhetoric that drove the ACA litigation and continues to
drive repeal efforts and resistance to implementation. These entrenched political
views temporarily stalled expansion efforts in Michigan, despite strong support
from the state’s Republican governor.385
Throughout the ACA litigation, there was little question that Medicaid

382 Brino, supra note 360 (quoting Governor Scott) (“‘[The House plan] will cost Florida taxpayers on top of what they are already taxed under the President’s new healthcare law [and] would
be a double–hit to state taxpayers.’”); Roy, April, supra note 356 (alteration in original) (quoting
same, suggesting that Scott “blasted” the House proposal and noting that it “spends far less state
money than Obamacare does”); Roy, May, supra note 361 (quoting same, but urging that “[Governor] “Scott is factually incorrect,” noting cost of Medicaid expansion compared to cost of House
proposal).
383 Kliff, supra note 373; James M. Taylor, Florida House Rejects Medicaid Expansion, Outcome
in Doubt, Heartlander ( July 2, 2013), http://news.heartland.org/newspaper–article/2013/07/02/
florida–house–rejects–medicaid–expansion–outcome–doubt.
384 See supra Parts I, II.
385 See supra Part III.C.3.
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expansion was a constitutional exercise of congressional spending power,386 just
as challenges to prior Medicaid amendments or similar conditional spending
programs have consistently been upheld.387 Litigants in the Health Care Cases
had not even prepared briefs on the “what if ” question, should the Court strike
down the Medicaid provisions.388 Red State lawmakers should redirect their
objections to other aspects of federal health reform and recognize that this part
of the law, at least, does not threaten their federalism principles in any serious
way. If they could recognize that Medicaid expansion offers considerable
flexibility and that federal funding would address vexing state budgetary and
public policy challenges, they might be willing to come around.
Repeatedly since its enactment, Medicaid has been expanded to new groups
of beneficiaries.389 Those expansions imposed significant new requirements on
states, admittedly not always without protest. Like the ACA, they represented
evolving policy priorities addressing which individuals are appropriate objects
of government assistance.390 In passing the ACA, Congress eventually agreed
that everyone below 138% FPL, regardless of categorical status of age,
disability, parenthood, or employment, deserved government assistance. That
change to the Medicaid program is remarkable from a health policy—but not
a constitutional—perspective.391 The arguments in NFIB resonated not because
386 See Florida ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235,
1263–68 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding Medicaid expansion was within congressional spending power);
Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1267 (N.D.
Fla. 2011), aff ’d in part, rev’d in part, 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011) (“[T]here is simply no support for
the state plaintiffs’ coercion argument in existing case law.”); Huberfeld et al., supra note 6, at 30,
31–32 (describing the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning and noting that no lower court had declared the
Medicaid expansion unconstitutional).
387 See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 22 (1981) (finding that
the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act created shared responsibilities
between the federal and state governments); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 593–98
(1937) (rejecting the claim that the Social Security Act’s tax collection and unemployment benefits
distribution infringed on state sovereignty); California v. United States, 104 F.3d 1086, 1092 (9th
Cir. 1997) (upholding an additional Medicaid requirement to cover emergency medical care to illegal immigrants); Oklahoma v. Schweiker, 655 F.2d 401, 416–17 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that the
pass–through provision of the Social Security Act was a “conventional and appropriate” use of congressional power under the Spending Clause). In Texas v. Leavitt, the plaintiffs requested that the
Supreme Court assert original jurisdiction to review the Medicare Part D clawback, which required
states to pay a portion of the new Medicare prescription–drug benefit. Plaintiffs’ Reply Brief at 1,
Texas v. Leavitt, 547 U.S. 1204 (2006) (No. 135). The Supreme Court was unwilling to hear the challenge, denying the states’ petition for original jurisdiction. Texas, 547 U.S. 1204 (mem.).
388 See Huberfeld et al., supra note 6, at 35 (citations omitted) (“Almost as an afterthought, the
United States pointed out the ‘separability’ clause in § 1303, providing that should any provision of
the Act be declared invalid, the remainder should remain unaffected.”).
389 See supra Part II.C (describing prior amendments to eligibility).
390 See supra Part II.
391 But see NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2606 (2012) (“Previous amendments to Medicaid
eligibility merely altered and expanded the boundaries of these categories. Under the Affordable
Care Act, Medicaid is transformed into a program to meet the health care needs of the entire non-
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there was something so different about what Congress had done this time
around, but because the political climate around states’ rights and principles
of federalism was so ripe. As previously noted, NFIB can be viewed as the
completion of Justice Rehnquist’s federalism revolution.392
In addition, the flexibility afforded to states in the benefits package offered to
new Medicaid beneficiaries under the ACA should be understood as consistent
with the evolution of the Medicaid program and respectful of state autonomy
under the Tenth Amendment. Far from a federal cram–down, the ACA allows
states to custom–design, within certain parameters, the benefits package for
the expansion population. States may offer the traditional Medicaid package,
a benchmark or benchmark–equivalent package, a managed care plan, or any
other novel approach that the federal government approves under its long–
standing waiver authority.393 The Court’s opinion erroneously suggests that the
ACA was the first introduction of a distinct Medicaid benefits package.394 More
importantly, the opinion relies on the fact of this variation as proof that the
ACA’s Medicaid amendments exceed Congress’s conditional spending power.
Had the Court better understood the history of the Medicaid program and
the actual operation of the ACA’s approach to Medicaid benefits,395 it might
have realized that the flexible arrangement promoted, rather than destroyed,
federalism principles.
The Court’s last reason for characterizing Medicaid expansion as
different in kind was that it provides more generous federal financing for
the new population of beneficiaries than for individuals already eligible for
the program.396 But this difference, too, should not render the mandatory
operation of the statute unconstitutional. The federal government’s payment
of 100% of expansion costs for three years, and 90% of expansion costs in
perpetuity,397 does not coerce states. Instead, the arrangement puts near total
federal financial support for expanding coverage through states’ established
public benefits channels. Indeed, as several states’ governors noted, the
infusion of federal dollars merely supports health reforms they had already
enacted and, in many cases, will relieve them of the costs of doing so.398
elderly population with income below 133 percent of the poverty level.”).
392 See Huberfeld et al., supra note 6, at 47–50.
393 See supra notes 107–26 (discussing Medicaid waivers and flexibility).
394 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2606 (“The conditions on use of the different funds are also distinct.
Congress mandated that newly eligible persons receive a level of coverage that is less comprehensive than the traditional Medicaid benefit package.”).
395 See supra notes 107–26 (describing history of Medicaid coverage amendments).
396 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2606 (“Congress created a separate funding provision to cover the costs
of providing services to any person made newly eligible by the expansion.”).
397 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(y)(1) (2012).
398 See, e.g., Sommers & Epstein, supra note 154, at 498 tbl.2 (alteration in original) (“Many
governors who support the Medicaid expansion argued that it builds on previous coverage expansions in their states and that it would actually save their states money by replacing local dollars with
federal funds. Peter Shumlin (D–VT) explained that opponents ‘are acting like we are not already
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Even for states that had not voluntarily extended some benefits to the
new Medicaid population, it is still an undeniably better deal to let the federal
government pay the lion’s share of the costs, rather than designing and funding
a novel state solution. States, of course, may choose to do nothing—to opt out
of Medicaid expansion and to decline to offer any form of state assistance to
the uninsured. But the inevitable costs to health care providers of providing
uncompensated care and to employers paying higher insurance premiums as a
result of cost shifting will adversely impact states’ economies and commerce.399
Accordingly, the second key element of the Red State Narrative is the
economic argument. Medicaid expansion, by almost all accounts, is an
extraordinarily good deal for states. Think tanks, consumer advocacy groups,
health policy institutes, chambers of commerce, and others have prepared
numerous analyses demonstrating the net economic benefit for states, which
are hard to refute.400 States counter that even a one or two percent increase in
state Medicaid costs is unsustainable, even if that increase represents a very
small sum relative to the large infusion of new federal dollars.401 But that
argument must be considered against the harder to quantify costs, described in
the previous paragraph, for which states may not have budgeted. In tight budget
times, it is hard to understand how states can walk away from a significant pot
of federal funding. Moreover, states should recognize, as Florida’s Governor
Scott did, that refusing to take federal Medicaid expansion dollars only hurts
their citizens, who will continue to pay federal taxes toward Medicaid expansion
being undertaken in other states but being refused by their own.
The third element of the Red State Narrative is voter pressure from a
politically compelling constituency. Arizona provides the clearest examples
of this dynamic at work. There, a Tea Party stalwart governor was willing to
retract prior strongly voiced objections to federal health care reform and cross
party lines to embrace Medicaid expansion because it was favored by the state’s
strong Latino constituency. Similar voter dynamics drove Red State governors
in other Southwestern states, namely Nevada and New Mexico, to accept
Medicaid expansion.
Whether these governors’ support for the ACA’s Medicaid amendment
expresses evolved notions of the “deserving poor” or simply the politics of
voter demographics, the outcome is the same. Nevada’s governor, for one, made
public statements suggesting the former. Among other reasons for supporting
expansion, Governor Martinez noted an “obligation to provide an adequate

paying for this. What we’re proposing . . . is to pay less for something that we are already paying
for right now.’”).
399 See supra notes 221–31 (citing studies estimating impact of Medicaid expansion on state
economies).
400 See supra notes 202–216, 226–28 (citing various studies).
401 See supra notes 173–77, 182–86 (citing, for example, Georgia’s 2.5 to 4.5% budget increase to
support expansion).
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level of basic health care services for the most in need of our state.”402 The
suggestion that individuals other than the elderly, disabled, children, pregnant
women, and some parents might be included among those “most in need” is
the very point that Justice Ginsburg made in rebuttal to Chief Justice Roberts’s
suggestion about the fundamental change wrought by the ACA’s Medicaid
expansion.403
While Latino voters in the Southwest may be a region–specific constituency,
similar campaigns could be mounted in other parts of the country. Particularly
in the deeply resistant South, African–American voters have indicated strong
support for Medicaid expansion404 and may represent a significant voter
demographic. Significantly, convincing reasons for supporting Medicaid
expansion among this group include both economic and morality arguments.405
Those who opposed Medicaid expansion are more likely to be persuaded if it is
good for business and the state’s economy.406 The majority of those who already
supported expansion did so because they believe that the program serves as an
important safety net for vulnerable members of society.407
Other stakeholders who have spoken out in support of Medicaid expansion
include health care providers and business owners. Health care providers in
Red States are facing a health reform bait–and–switch with the loss of DSH
funding and the remaining cost of treating uninsured patients who otherwise
could be covered by Medicaid expansion.408 Business owners may face increased
costs from the pressure to provide health insurance to low–income employees
who would otherwise be Medicaid–eligible, and from higher premiums for
currently insured employees as health care providers attempt to shift the costs
of uncompensated care.409 These groups, while traditionally more aligned with
conservative agendas, could represent a compelling constituency to push Red
State leaders toward Medicaid expansion, given this economic impact.
The Arkansas plan represents the fourth and fifth elements of the Red State
Narrative. The fourth is that Red State leaders need a way to save political
face. The fifth is that the plan must retain a significant nod to the private
market. Having gone to the mat, challenging the constitutionality of Medicaid
expansion all the way to the nation’s highest court and vowing repeatedly to
402 Domrzalski, supra note 260 (quoting Governor Martinez).
403 See supra notes 19–22 (referring to Roberts’s and Ginsburg’s opinions).
404 See Bositis, supra note 235, at 5 tbl.2 (reporting findings that 85.3% of African Americans
surveyed supported Medicaid expansion, compared to 53.3% non–Hispanic whites).
405 See id. at 10–21 (discussing respondents’ reactions to five arguments and/or factual reasons
to support Medicaid expansion).
406 Id. at 12–13 & tbl.2 (regarding argument that Medicaid expansion would create new jobs,
economic activity, and tax revenue, which 27% of opponents found persuasive).
407 Id. at 20–21 & tbl.2 (regarding safety net argument, convincing to 57% of respondents).
408 See supra notes 224–27 and accompanying text (describing DSH cuts, as related to Medicaid opt out).
409 See supra notes 228–29 (discussing employer impact of Medicaid opt out).

2013– 2014 ]

the red state option

437

decline federal invitations to support health reform, these lawmakers now need
a way to alter their positions without alienating supporters. Even if convinced
by the economic models or the political pressure of significant constituencies,
they need a way to retain some sense of Tea Party dignity. For Arkansas’s
Republican legislature and, to a lesser degree, Florida’s Governor Scott, the
face–saving maneuver was the suggestion that they fought for—and won—
meaningful concessions from the federal government.410 They wanted to convey
an image of negotiated federalism.411
In Arkansas, that image was cultivated by portraying the premium support
privatized approach to Medicaid expansion as a radically new design, a “game
changer,”412 even though the option to enroll Medicaid beneficiaries in private,
individual health insurance plans has been available to states since the beginning
of the program.413 Historically, however, the individual insurance market
has not functioned adequately to offer affordable products that would meet
Medicaid requirements. The hope is that the newly created health insurance
exchanges will make that possible. But significant questions remain about how
the Arkansas plan will be implemented.
Nevertheless, the concept has attracted considerable attention from other
Red States’ leaders, who recognize the financial benefits of Medicaid expansion
but do not want to compromise their Tea Party bona fides.414 The plan allows
Republican lawmakers in the state, first, to tout the “victory” they scored in
getting federal authorities to agree to the privatized approach and, second, to
stay true to their preference for market–based solutions to social problems.
Although less radical than the Arkansas plan, Governor Scott of Florida
employed a similar strategy, publicly announcing that the state had “won” two
Medicaid waivers from the federal government just before announcing his

410 See Using Medicaid Dollars, supra note 284 (“[T]he main benefit [of the Arkansas plan]
would be political in that it could engage Republicans in the whole health reform effort, make it
easier to carry out the law and reduce the appetite among Congressional Republicans to gut the
law.”).
411 See supra note 12 (discussing various scholars’ depictions of federalism as a negotiated process between federal and state authorities).
412 See supra note 269 and accompanying text; Rosenbaum & Sommers, The Great New Experiment, supra note 15, at 8.
413 See supra note 126 and accompanying text (discussing Medicaid program premium support
provisions).
414 See Rosenbaum & Sommers, The Great New Experiment, supra note 15, at 7 (“[O]ther
states, including Ohio, appear to be negotiating with the federal government over replacing the
standard Medicaid approach with premium assistance.”); Rovner, supra note 270 (“[T]he Arkansas
plan] has caught the attention of several other Republican–run states that had been holding out on
the Medicaid expansion, including Ohio, Florida and even Texas.”); Somashekhar, supra note 283
(“[Federal] HHS officials have indicated other states might be permitted to use a similar strategy
[to Arkansas’s].”); see Johnson, supra note 14 (“Republican governors and lawmakers in other states
such as Michigan, Pennsylvania and Iowa are asking the CMS to allow alternative models for
expanding coverage.”).
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support for Medicaid expansion.415 House Republicans in Florida, however, had
different ideas. Instead, they proposed a fully state–funded, much more limited,
voucher program, available to uninsured individuals who were willing and
able to make a modest monthly contribution and maintain certain work–hour
requirements. The proposal would cover just over half of the Medicaid expansion
population, the remainder of which would be left to fend for themselves.
The Michigan legislation signed after a special summer session and the
proposal still under consideration in Florida are examples of the fifth element
of the Red State Narrative—retaining market–based models of delivery. The
Michigan law retains strong private market and individual responsibility
components, consistent with preferences of those opposing Obamacare. If the
federal government approves Michigan’s waivers, low–income, non–disabled
adults would receive Medicaid but still would be treated differently than the
traditional “deserving poor.” They would be required to pay annual copayments,
as a percentage of their income, and would have to manage a portion of their
own health care costs through health savings accounts. Moreover, the expansion
population would be discouraged from long–term dependence on government
assistance, with increased financial obligations after a certain time limit.
Florida’s proposed version, a fully state–funded and administered program,
takes those approaches to the extreme. Under the CARE plan, Medicaid
beneficiaries would face substantial cost–sharing obligations and would be
fully exposed to the private insurance market. Florida’s approach does little
to advance the Red State Narrative of bringing recalcitrant states toward
acceptance of Medicaid expansion. Rather, it is premised on all of the familiar
objections to expansion, including concerns about federal authorities reneging
on the funding promise, reluctance to expand a dysfunctional public welfare
program, desire to limit federal involvement in state affairs, and philosophical
objections to programs that increase individuals’ dependency on government
assistance. The current impasse in the Florida legislature likely cannot be
overcome unless other elements of the Red State Narrative are invoked.
Conclusion
As part of Congress’s goal of near universal health insurance coverage,
the ACA granted states extraordinarily generous federal financial support to
extend their existing Medicaid programs to additional low–income, uninsured
individuals. Congress declared everyone below 138% FPL eligible for
government health insurance and promised to pay the lion’s share of the costs
for those new beneficiaries. It was a very good deal for states.
Nevertheless, twenty–six states challenged the constitutionality of the ACA’s
Medicaid expansion as unduly “coercive.” Their claim was that the amendment
made their existing federal Medicaid funding contingent on accepting the new
415 See supra notes 349–52 and accompanying text (quoting Governor Scott’s press release and
other sources).
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funding under the ACA. Against all odds, the Supreme Court accepted this
argument and held that the Medicaid expansion could stand only if states had
a choice whether to accept it or not. States that opted in would receive the
generous federal funding and would be required to cover the new group. States
that opted out could continue to operate their Medicaid programs and receive
federal funding under the pre–ACA terms.
One year after the Court’s decision, a bare majority of states have agreed
to expand Medicaid while the rest have either affirmatively refused or delayed
deciding whether to expand. This Article focuses on the political landscape in
those latter states electing the so–called Red State Option. It draws lessons
from a significant group of Republican–controlled states that broke ranks and
joined the former group of opt–in states.
In financial terms, Medicaid expansion seems like the obvious choice.
States can cover a group of historically uninsured adults and children at little
to no cost to themselves. Doing so further relieves their health care providers
and employers of the cost of treating or insuring those individuals. Medicaid
expansion can also contribute to job growth and increased tax revenue resulting
from that economic activity. Moreover, Medicaid expansion has broad popular
support, especially among certain minority populations likely to benefit from
the program. Despite these facts, some states remain recalcitrant, hewing the
Tea Party rhetoric that is anti–“Obamacare,” anti–Big Government, and anti–
public welfare.
This Article offers those states a way forward—a Red State Narrative that
allows them to take advantage of the generous federal funding without losing
political face. Case studies of other Red States inform the narrative, suggesting
certain essential dynamics. First, states must adjust their understanding of the
Supreme Court’s opinion and recognize that the ACA’s amendments to the
Medicaid program are not, after all, constitutionally significant. Second, states
must acknowledge the nearly irrefutable economic analyses demonstrating the
net benefit of Medicaid expansion. Third, a politically compelling constituency
within opt–out or hold–out states may have to push for expansion. Fourth, Red
State lawmakers must be able to suggest at least the appearance of a negotiated
settlement, including a significant concession from the federal government,
before they agree to expansion. Fifth and finally, Red States will prefer for their
particular version of Medicaid expansion to operate largely within the private
health insurance market, consistent with conservative health reform strategies.
As state legislatures reconvene for the 2014 session, they will have the
opportunity to reconsider their current Medicaid expansion elections. Opt–
in states will be able to evaluate whether the financial and other incentives
are paying off. Opt–out states will have a year of data on the budgetary and
political impact of declining federal funding. The Article anticipates that
the elements of the Red State Narrative will persuade at least some of those
states to provide government assistance to a deserving group of low–income,
uninsured individuals within their borders.

